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I. INTRODUCTION
These are turbulent times for health care in America. Health care costs are
spiraling out of control,1 quality evaluations reveal a plethora of errors affecting
delivery and outcome of care,2 and a growing number of citizens find themselves
without the ability to afford services or obtain access to care.3 A three-way battle
wages among government regulators, health care providers,4 and patients.5
Government regulation is employed to improve quality and cost, hospitals and
providers fight to stay economically viable while providing accessible and efficient
care, and individual citizens are in desperate need of dependable and affordable
medical services.6 The reasons for this battle are as varied as the proposed solutions.
Congress now enters this fray through a proposed Medicare payment scheme that
introduces a new philosophy of self-protective cost containment that masquerades as
a method of quality improvement.7 This new plan seeks to shift costs further onto
hospitals and providers by the government’s refusal to pay for certain services
rendered for emergent, in-hospital care.8 Congress proposes to employ a hindsight
review technique that denies payment for medical care when that care is deemed to
have been preventable, adverse, and with resultant serious effect as defined by
Medicare officials.9

1

Brief Summaries of Medicare and Medicaid 16, November 1, 2006, available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareProgramRatesStats/downloads/MedicareMedicaidSummari
es2006.pdf.
2

Linda T. Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan & Molla S. Donaldson, To Err is Human: Building a
Safer Health System, NAT’L ACAD. PRESS (Nov. 1, 1999), available at http://www.iom.edu/
CMS/8089/5575.aspx.
3
DONALD L. BARLETT & JAMES B. STEELE, CRITICAL CONDITION: HOW HEALTH CARE IN
AMERICA BECAME BIG BUSINESS – AND BAD MEDICINE 2-3 (2004); KATHLEEN HOGUE ET AL,
THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO HEALTH INSURANCE: HOW TO BEAT THE HIGH COST OF BEING SICK
181 (1988).
4

Provider is defined for the purposes of this note as any entity that provides medical
services to a patient. This would include hospitals (the main focus of this note), physicians and
associated entities such as nurse practitioners, physician assistants, etc.
5
“Patient” generally refers to a beneficiary of Medicare throughout this note. There are
many other entities that are involved in this triangle of care such as employers of beneficiaries,
employees of providers, other health insurance entities, and share holders of for profit
organizations. See generally ROBERT D. MILLER, PROBLEMS IN HEALTH CARE LAW (9th ed.
2006) for a discussion of the myriad interactions.
6

Leah Snyder Batchis, Can Lawsuits Help the Uninsured Access Affordable Hospital
Care? Potential Theories for Uninsured Patient Plaintiffs, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 493, 494 (2005).
7

42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(4)(D) (2007).

8

Id.

9

Id.
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Medicare officials have identified ten events that they believe to be the result of
preventable provider actions.10 These events result in serious “injury” to the patient
and are considered to be both costly and frequent.11 Therefore, Medicare officials
have determined that denial of payment for the necessary medical care that results
from these events is permissible as quality and cost control measures.12 However,
contrary to the espoused intent of quality improvement, this scheme will likely
endanger access to care and ultimately increase cost by further penalizing financially
struggling hospitals and by shifting patients into the ranks of the under-insured.13
Furthermore, if, as expected, other insurance entities throughout the nation follow
suit and deny payment for necessary medical care because of unilaterally defined
“serious preventable events,”14 then foreseeable consequences include an extension
of the philosophical precedent where preventability equates with non-payment.15
This precedent is a reflection of the inherent spending power of third-party payors
that may be extended to influence non-criminal personal behavior through financial
penalty.16 Refusal of payment for needed services conditioned upon the occurrence
of unavoidable events represents an unjust punishment of hospitals and providers.17

10

CMS, Hospital Acquired Conditions, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/HospitalAcq
Cond/06_Hospital-Acquired_Conditions.asp (last visited Sept. 10, 2008).
11

Id.

12

Id.

13

See, e.g., Batchis, supra note 6; Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy
in Health Insurance, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 73, 76 (2005) (noting that unhealthy individuals
suffer insurance discrimination and are consequently “exposed to many of the same harms that
uninsured persons face”).
14

See e.g., Kevin O’Reilly, No Pay for “Never Event” Errors Becoming Standard, AM.
MED. NEWS, Jan. 7, 2008, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2008/07/07/
prsc0107.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2008); Carol Ann Campbell, Medicare Ends Coverage of
Hospital Errors: New Incentive for better Care, STAR LEDGER, August 12, 2007, available at
Westlaw, 2007 WLNR 15589174.
15

See, e.g. Crossley, supra note 13, at 135.

16

To some extent this is the current situation. Many third-party payers are already
penalizing otherwise healthy individuals by charging higher premiums for those who smoke or
are over weight. Smokers may prevent the increased risk of pulmonary disease by not smoking
and over weight individuals may decrease their weight and thereby prevent increased risks of
health problems by diet and exercise. This phenomenon is generally known as “risk selection,”
“adverse selection,” or “underwriting.” See generally Crossley, supra note 13, at 135; MIB
Group, Inc., A Few Words About Insurance and Underwriting” available at
http://www.mib.com/html/insurance_underwriting.html (last visited March 14, 2008); Linda
J. Blumberg, Ph.D., Addressing Adverse Selection in Private Health Insurance Markets
(September 22, 2004) (addressing the Congress of the United States Joint Economic
Committee) available at http://www.urban.org/publications/900752.html.
17
See Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just”
Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 843 (2002). Unjust punishment may occur when a defendant
who is factually and legally guilty of committing an act which has been unjustly defined to be
a crime. Id. at 885. It may be argued that an unavoidable adverse event or one not caused by
the hospital is not a crime that requires punishment because the hospital is innocent of the act.
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Moreover, denial of payment because a patient engages in actions which purportedly
cause illness represents an invasion into the fundamental freedom of lifestyle choice
that individual Americans enjoy.18
The government’s plan to utilize non-standardized and unexplained data
compiled by providers as a means to track these identified serious preventable events
available for public review is also concerning.19 This data is published prior to
appeals by providers and is intended to be used as a public quality measure of the
provider.20 Publication of this data has been strongly opposed by the medical
community who claim that undeserved adverse publicity and increased litigation
based upon the unexplained data will result.21
This note proposes that Congress avoid this change in fundamental philosophy
and continue to provide reasonable payment for services rendered, regardless of
cause for the needed care. Instead, Medicare’s vast constitutionally authorized
spending power should be utilized to encourage quality improvements through
extensive data compilation and cooperative analysis that focuses on quality
improvement and cost balancing.22 Through legislative power, Congress may play a
central role that guides improvements,23 while focus remains placed squarely upon
the original intent of the Medicare program to enable vulnerable elderly, poor and
disabled citizens to obtain health care.24
This note begins with a brief review of the history, purpose, governance and
funding of the Medicare program. Next will be a review of the program’s impact
upon the medical industry. An evaluation of the need for cost and quality
improvements that leads to the proposed non-payment scheme follows. Subsequent
sections analyze the authority and rationality of the proposed spending scheme

18

See supra note 16. Today, adult American citizens generally believe in civil freedoms
that allow individuals to voluntarily engage in actions that involve health risk such as
smoking, drinking, eating any food source in any amount, or participating in sports and
activities that endanger their health, such as rock climbing or motorcycle racing, without extra
cost for medical insurance. Id. generally.
19
Kohn, supra note 2, at 98, 181-82; CMS mandates compilation and submission of
information regarding any of the identified serious adverse events and defined as “quality”
data as a condition of participation in Medicare. Deficit Reduction Act § 5001(c) (2005); see
also CMS, Reporting [of Hospital Acquired Conditions], available at http://www.cms.hhs.
gov/HospitalAcqCond/04_Reporting.asp#TopOfPage , (last visited March 14, 2008).
20

Id.

21

Maxine M. Harrington, Revisiting Medical Error: Five Years after the IOM Report,
Have Reporting Systems made a Measurable Difference?, 15 HEALTH MATRIX 329, 352-53
(2005); See also Kohn, supra note 2, at 109-111; Brian A. Liang, The Adverse Event of
Unaddressed Medical Error: Identifying and Filling the Holes in the Health Care and Legal
Systems, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 346,359 (2001); See, e.g. Robert Pear, Experts Cast Doubt on
Medical Reporting Plan, N.Y. TIMES, FEBRUARY 23, 2000), at A12, available at Westlaw
2000 WLNR 2999216.
22

See infra Part XI.

23

Id.

24

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395c (West 2008).
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followed by an evaluation of consequences. The problematic publication of data
compiled for proposed quality control is then briefly reviewed. Finally, this note will
suggest that Congress reconsider this change in payment philosophy and instead
accept a leadership role that encourages cooperative resolution to the quality
improvement and cost efficiency issues that face the health care industry today.
II. THE HISTORY OF MEDICARE
A. Funding and Governance
Medicare was established by Congress and President Johnson as part of Social
Security in 1965 in response to a medical care crisis.25 Retired American citizens
were without affordable health care when they needed medical care most.26 This
crisis is strikingly similar to today’s medical scenario. Today, the medical care crisis
affects Americans younger than 65 years who are faced with exorbitant medical care
costs and lack a third-party payor.27 Today, as in 1965, adequate medical care in
America is too expensive for the average American without help from employers or
the government.28
Medicare and associated entities29 represent the only national health insurance
programs. These programs are guaranteed by federal law to all citizens over the age
of 65, the disabled and the poor.30 Medicare is generally funded by the current work
force through income tax and employer contributions.31 Payment is disbursed
through an established trust fund.32 Medicare is an insurance program because it
provides comprehensive care for a baseline fee by spreading the risk over the entire

25

See HOGUE, supra note 3, at 181; Peter A. Corning, The Evolution of Medicare ... from
idea to law, Social Sec. Admin. Office of Research & Statistics, 1969, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/history/corning.html.
26

Corning, supra note 25, at Ch. 4, ¶¶ 4-5 (noting the high cost of medical care as the
“greatest single cause of economic dependency in old age” where two thirds of elderly citizens
had annual incomes less than $1000 and only one out of eight had health insurance).
27
Batchis, supra note 6, at 494-95 (noting that in the year 2003 to 2004 forty-five million
people were uninsured and 85.2 million were without insurance for some period of that year).
28

See BARLETT, supra note 3, at 2-3.

29

The Medicare associated entities include Medicaid, and the State Children’s Health
Insurance Program (SCHIP). See http://www.cms.hhs.gov. Other associated federally funded
insurance programs include Civilian Health and Medical Program for the Uniformed Services
(CHAMPUS), Federal Employee Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), and the Veteran’s
Administration. MILLER, supra note 5, at 499.
30

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395c (West 2008).

31

See Federal Hospital Ins. Trust Fund, 42 U.S.C. § 1395i (2008), see also Social Security
& Medicare Boards of Trustees, Status of the Social Security & Medicare Programs: A
Summary of the 2007 Annual Reports: A Message to the Public,
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TRSUM/trsummary.html (April 23, 2007); Medicare Rights
Center, The History of Medicare and The Current Debate, available at htp://www.medicare
rights.org/maincontenthistory.html.
32

Federal Hospital Ins. Trust Fund, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395i(a) (West 2008).
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covered population.33 In this manner it functions as any private insurance company
and beneficiaries may receive care anywhere within the United States because the
insurance is provided at a national level.34 Moreover, patient choice is safeguarded
because services are paid without regard for how the injury or illness developed.35
Medicare consists of four parts labeled as A, B, C, and D. Part A is basic
Medicare,36 Part B is supplemental Medicare,37 Part C encompasses the Medicare
choice plans38 and Part D includes prescription coverage.39 Medicaid is an
adjunctive yet separate entity created to provide health assistance for individuals who
qualify for benefits based upon financial determinations rather than age.40 Medigap

33

Crossley, supra note 13, at 77-78.

34

This is true because even if a provider does not have a contract with Medicare, payment
for care may still be provided especially for emergent services. MILLER, supra note 5, at 505.
Medicare need not pay the provider directly. Id. Payment may be forwarded to the patient who
then remits payment to the provider. Id. Medicare requires that the provider accept the
payment even if the amount provided is less than what Medicare would pay to a provider who
is officially contracted with Medicare. Id. Medicare also forbids further claims against the
patient for any difference in cost for covered services. Id.
35

42 U.S.C.A. 1395a (West 2008). The current prospective payment system utilized by
Medicare for payment calculations does not preclude any serious adverse events although
there are defined diagnosis and therapies that are not covered such as most cosmetic surgeries
or care provided outside of the United States. See CMS, Your Medicare Benefits (2006)
available at http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/10116.pdf.
36

This is a compulsory program available to all qualifying citizens designed to cover aged
and disabled beneficiaries for certain hospital, post-hospital, home health and hospice services.
Eligible individuals include individuals who are older than 65 years and eligible for retirement
benefits, <65 years old and eligible through Social Security or Railroad benefits, or individuals
who have end-stage renal disease. See MILLER, supra note 5, at 500-01; see generally CMS
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov.
37

This is a non-compulsory service paid for electively by qualifying citizens and is
designed to cover costs not covered by Part A such as physician services. The program is
funded through monthly premiums and matching federal contributions. Id.
38
Eligible citizens may choose to implement coverage through private health plans.
Beneficiaries must be eligible for Parts A and/or B. Part C was established by the Balanced
Budget Act of 1997 codified in 42 U.S.C. section 1395w-21 and was implemented in Jan.
1999. This entity has largely been replaced by the Medicare Advantage plans established with
Part D. Id.; see Introduction to Medicare & Medicaid, 5 West’s Fed. Admin. Practice § 6301
(4th ed. 2007).
39
Part D was enacted as part of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and
Modernization Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C.A. section 1395w-101. Currently, only beneficiaries
who are enrolled in Part A and Part B, Medicare Advantage Plans or Medicare Savings
Account plans are eligible. Coverage began Jan. 1, 2006 and is currently being considered for
revision and greater inclusion. Id.
40

Medicaid is implemented through state authority and is jointly financed through state
and federal funds. This program is also called the Kerr-Mills Act and is found under Title XIX
of the Social Security Act. It is a voluntary program. See MILLER, supra note 5, at 511-12;
Introduction to Medicare & Medicaid, supra note 38.
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policies are provided by private insurance companies as supplemental insurance that
covers care not reimbursed by Medicare, such as deductibles and co-payments.41
Medicare is managed by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS).42 CMS is an agency created by the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS).43 These agencies are administrative entities that act under the
delegated authority of Congress and the President respectively.44 Specifically, CMS
has been granted the authority to oversee Medicare and its associated programs.45 To
that end, CMS has the authority to create regulations that affect its programs and
beneficiaries.46
B. Function and Purpose
The recognized purpose of the Medicare programs is to provide health care to
citizens who are elderly, disabled or are in financial need.47 Through this entity,
societal cost is dispersed across all working citizens.48 Traditionally, Medicare has
reimbursed necessary medical care regardless of the cause or the preventability of
the injury or illness that necessitated the care.49
Moreover, the beneficiary is afforded a degree of choice between qualified
providers and hospitals.50 Beneficiaries are allowed to travel throughout the United

41

HOGUE, supra note 3, at 182.

42

See CMS, Office of the Administrator, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/CMSLeadership/
08_Office_OA.asp#TopOfPage. CMS was called Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) prior to 2001.
43
See Dept. of Health & Human Serv. (DHHS), available at http://www.hhs.gov/about/
index.html#agencies.
44

DDHS is led by a Secretary who is appointed as a member of the president’s cabinet.
See http://www.hhs.gov.
45

Id.

46

Id.

47

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395c (West 2008); see also Corning, supra note 25; Judith Stein &
Alfred J. Chiplin, Jr., A Practical Guide to Medicare Hearings and Appeals, 34 REAL PROP.,
PROB. & TRUST J. 403, 405-08 (1999); Social Security Administration, Social Security
History, available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/history.html. Since inception, Medicare has
now expanded to cover in some way all citizens over the age of 65, the disabled and those
receiving end-stage renal care. Id.
48

Id.

49

42 U.S.C.A. 1395a (West 2008). Consider the patient who never saw a doctor, didn’t
take medications, smoke, drank, used illicit drugs, or fell at home. All of these problems are
considered to be preventable yet they are paid for because of need regardless of financial
status. See MILLER, supra note 5, at 500; see also Crossley, supra note 13, at 77-79 (describing
the communal pool as a social risk-sharing device).
50
42 U.S.C.A. 1395a (West 2008); see Alpha Center, A Special Report: Risk Adjustment:
A Key to Changing Incentives in the Health Insurance Market 5, produced for The Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation’s Changes in Health Care Financing & Org. Program (HCFO)
(1997) (identifying patient choice as a powerful desirable factor that drives insurance
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States knowing that a facility that provides Medicare coverage will be available.51
The program has traditionally recognized that modern health care in America is not
considered to be a right but rather a luxury afforded to those who can pay or who
have work benefits.52 Therefore, by providing payment for services based on need for
citizens with financial burdens and complex medical problems, Medicare has
eliminated some capitalistic restraint upon access to care and choice, because all
qualifying citizens have a guarantee of payment for medical services when they are
needed.53
II. MEDICARE’S IMPACT ON THE MEDICAL PROFESSION, INSURANCE INDUSTRY AND
THE GENERAL POPULATION
Medicare has had a significant impact upon the medical industry by defining and
controlling reimbursement through use of its congressionally granted spending
power.54 Medicare has become the leader in the field of medical reimbursement and
its negotiated prices have become the baseline by which other medical insurance
agencies determine fair reimbursement for specific types of care and services.55 By
determining covered services and the corresponding pay rates for those services,
Medicare has been – appropriately – accused of practicing Medicine.56
The advent of Medicare brought a significant change to the medical profession in
the United States.57 Although Medicare was intended to be only a payment method, it

decisions); see also Medicare: The Official U.S. Gov’t Site for People with Medicare,
available at http://www.medicare.gov/Choices/Overview.asp.
51
Id. Traditional Medicare has no limitations upon national travel while Medicare
Advantage plans may have different reimbursement plans for out of network facilities and
providers.
52

See, e.g., BARLETT, supra note 3, at 2-3.

53

Id. at 25; see also Stanley B. Jones, Medicare Influence on Private Insurance: Good or
Ill? 18 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 153, 159 (1996) available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/pdf/
MedicareInfluencePrivateInsurance.pdf.
54

42 U.S.C.A 1395b-1(a)(1)(A) (2008) (describing “incentives for economy while
maintaining or improving quality in provision of health services”); see also 42 U.S.C.A.
1395kk-1 (West 2008).
55

See Stanley B. Jones, Medicare Influence on Private Insurance: Good or Ill?, 18
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 157 (1996) (likening Medicare to a “700 pound gorilla” such that
“[w]hen it rolls over, providers who share the bed have no choice but to go along”).
56
See, e.g., Richard Dolinar & S. Luke Leininger, Pay for Performance or Compliance? A
Second Opinion on Medicare Reimbursement, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 397, 419 (2006);
Lawrence R. Huntoon, M.D., Ph.D., President Assoc. of Am. Physicians and Surgeons, Fraud,
Abuse, and the Medicare Industrial Complex: A Practicing Physician’s View, Address Before
the Heritage Foundation (March 1, 2000), in Pamphlet No. 1073, Assoc. of Am. Physicians
and Surgeons, Inc., May 2000, at 2, available at http://www.aapsonline.org/brochures/
lhherita.htm.
57

See, e.g., Batchis, supra note 6, at 501 (noting Medicare’s impact upon hospital
charges).
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has become a vehicle for government control of medical care.58 Through its spending
power, the federal government has sought, gained control over, and now dictates
reimbursement schedules for most medical treatments.59 Originally, Medicare paid
the full reasonable cost of services provided to beneficiaries.60 However, through
unilateral incremental pay reductions, Medicare has progressed to payment of only a
percentage of the actual cost of care and has unilaterally determined compensation
rates for physicians and hospital care.61 Many private insurance companies have
followed suit and now pay or negotiate for the Medicare determined rates.62
Insurance officials argue that if the providers can afford these rates for governmental
insurance, then their private insurance should enjoy the same payment scheme.63
Inflationary prices result, especially for uninsured patients because the price
claimed by providers for a given service is elevated to offset the lower amount paid
by insurances.64 For this reason, the billed medical cost is significantly higher than
the amount actually paid and accepted.65 Medicare and health insurance companies in
general have inflated the cost of medicine by encouraging underpayment.66 This cost
inflation is reflected in the exorbitant charges of hospital care to the uninsured.67 In
short, persons without insurance are forced to pay inflated rates for medical care
because those payments are needed to subsidize the insufficient Medicare and private
insurance reimbursements.68 However, over time Medicare has become more than
an insurance entity.

58

See supra note 56.

59

Mark V. Pauly, Symposium: The Future of Medicare, Post Great Society and Post PlusChoice: Legal and Policy Issues: What if Technology Never Stops Improving? Medicare’s
Future Under Continuous Cost Increases, 60 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 1233, 1236 (2003).
60

Jones, supra note 55, at 156.

61

Batchis, supra note 6, at 501-02 (noting that Medicare and other third-party payers
negotiate “steep discounts” that do not reimburse the actual cost of care); see also Raymond
G. Davis, Health Care Reform and the Probabilities of Change, 3-WTR KAN. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 25, 28-29 (1993/1994).
62

Id.; Margaret Cross, Confronting the Medicare Cost Shift, MANAGED CARE *3, Dec.
2006, available at http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0612/0612.costshift.html.
63

Cross, supra note 62.

64

Leah Snyder Batchis, Can Lawsuits Help the Uninsured Access Affordable Hospital
Care? Potential Theories for Uninsured Patient Plaintiffs, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 493, 501 (2005);
R. Brent Rawlings & Hugh E. Aaron, The Effect of Hospital Charges on Outlier Payments
under Medicare’s Inpatient Prospective Payment System: Prudent Financial Management or
Illegal Conduct?, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 267, 294-297 (2005).
65
Batchis, supra note 6, at 501-04 (identifies the “chargemaster price” as the inflated price
computed by hospitals as a means to negotiate for a better percentage of reimbursement from
insurances and to shift the cost of the discount onto the uninsured).
66

Id.

67

Id.

68

Id.
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Through this control of price and payment, Medicare officials have progressively
intruded into the practice of medicine.69 The Medicare Act clearly declares that
Medicare is “not to be construed as practicing medicine.”70 Yet, initially through
control of payment, and now through the threat of non-payment for identified serious
adverse events, the government is, in effect, practicing medicine.71 Far beyond
merely paying for services, Medicare officials have created a complex
reimbursement code system whereby medical care may be completely controlled and
tracked.72 This code determines what medical diagnoses are covered, which services
are reimbursable to treat the diagnosis, what the length of recovery should be, and
what follow-up care is required.73 These codes generalize medical illness and create a
“cook-book” approach to like-defined diseases at the expense of more complicated
illnesses or more compromised patients.74
Moreover, hospitals and providers that receive federal funding through the
Medicare program are increasingly obligated to comply with incrementally invasive
regulations.75 A large portion of hospitals depend upon Medicare payments because
the majority of their patient base is comprised of Medicare beneficiaries.76 Federal

69

See infra notes 70-76.

70

Prohibition against any Federal Interference, 42 U.S.C. 1395 (1965).

71

The practice of medicine may be defined broadly as the diagnosing and treating of
human ailments. 16 A.L.R. 4th 58 § 3[a] (defining chiropractics as a practice of medicine).
CMS has established and imposed treatment protocols that create a one-size-fits-all method for
diagnosing and treating some common emergent illnesses such as pneumonia, myocardial
infarction, and surgical infection prevention. See Quality Improvement Organization (QIO),
QIO Efforts to Reduce Healthcare Disparities 2002-2005: Final Report of Progress, Findings,
and Results of QIO Projects 5-6 (2005) available at http://www.ahqa.org/pub/uploads/QIOs_
Reduce_Disparities_Final_Report_w_Cover.pdf. Adherence to these protocols is tied to
reimbursement and is used as a measure of quality. Id. In effect, the government instead of
medical professionals, has determined diagnosis, treatment and expected outcomes for specific
disease processes. This exemplifies the practice of medicine.
72

Dolinar, supra note 56, at 398, 403.

73

Id. at 398, 403.

74

Id. at 398, 403; see also QIO, supra note 71.

75

See Dolinar, supra note 56, at 398, 403; QIO, supra note 71; see also 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000d-1; CMS, Conditions for Coverage & Conditions of Participation, available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/CFCsAndCoPs/; Title 42, Ch. IV, Part 482 (2008) available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_04/42cfr482_04.html. These regulations are
incremental because they begin with only coding or grouping of related diagnoses but
increasingly impose time-restraints on care, types of drugs to be used, and types of therapies to
be employed for the diagnosis. See QIO, supra note 71. New conditions of participation in
Medicare involve regulation of the composition of the governing boards of participating
hospitals. See Michael O. Leavitt, Sec’y of Health & Human Serv., Report to Congress:
Improving the Medicare Quality Improvement Organization Program – Response to the Inst.
Of Med. Study 33-34 (2006), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/QualityImprovementOrgs/
downloads/QIO_Improvement_RTC_fnl.pdf.
76
Dolinar, supra note 56, at 406; The Am. Hosp. Assoc., Underpayment by Medicare and
Medicaid: Fact Sheet *1 (2007) (noting that 55 percent of all care provided by hospitals is
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law has mandated that no patient, regardless of ability to pay, may be turned away
from any hospital facility when emergency care is needed.77 Although this altruistic
measure ensures emergency care to all citizens, it also forces all hospitals to accept
Medicare or provide coverage for free or below cost.78 Also, through retrospective
review of patient beneficiary admissions, Medicare officials may unilaterally
determine that certain provided services are included in a prorated global fee79 and
are therefore non-payable by either Medicare or the beneficiary.80 The increasing
number of services provided for free or only partially reimbursed, because of the
lack of available personal funds or insurance, has resulted in the closing or
consolidation of hospitals all over the United States.81 The federal government
currently provides support to some facilities by funding “non-recoverable services”
known as “bad debt” which prevents some closures.82
Through this spending control, and by specifically denying recovery of funds
from the patient for medical treatments that Medicare officials deem in hindsight to
be unnecessary or globally inclusive, Medicare officials may now dictate the specific
care a patient should receive, how long the care should take, how long the patient
should be hospitalized, and what medications they should receive.83 Changes
effective October 2008 will increase Medicare’s power to determine what
complications a patient should or should not develop, and who is liable for the cost
of those complications.84

funded by Medicare and Medicaid), available at http://www.aha.org/aha/content/2007/pdf/07medicare-shortfall.pdf.; see also Am. Hosp. Assoc., Hospital Facts to Know, available at
http://www.aha.org/aha/content/2007/pdf/07-am-hospital-facts.pdf, (2007).
77
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. 1395dd(a)
(2003).
78

42 U.S.C.A. 1395dd(b)(1) (West 2003).

79
The Prospective Payment System imposed by Medicare for most services represents a
global fee that includes all services and therapies utilized to treat the diagnosis. MILLER, supra
note 5, at 502. For example, the Medicare fee paid to the hospital for pyelonephritis (kidney
infection) will be the same regardless of which antibiotics must be used for treatment. One
patient may only need a generic, affordable antibiotic while another may require an expensive
alternative because of allergies. The pro-rated global fee places the loss of added expense of
the medication upon the hospital provider. Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat.65 (1983), as amended
by Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1073 (1984).
80

HOGUE, supra note 3, at 205.

81

See, e.g. Svetlana Lebedinski, EMTALA: Treatment of Undocumented Aliens and the
Financial Burden it Places on Hospitals, 7 J.L. SOC’Y 146, 155 (2005); see also Am. Hospital
Assoc., Protecting the Promise 13 (2004), available at http://www.aha.org/aha/content/2004/
pdf/ProtectingThePromise.pdf (last visited March 16, 2008) (noting 900 hospital closings from
1980 to 2004).
82

Id.

83

See supra note 75.

84

Id.; but see Am. Med. Assoc. v. Matthews, 429 F. Supp. 1179 (N.D. Ill. 1977)(finding
that regulations to control cost do not constitute supervision or control of medicine); Coll. Of
Am. Pathologists v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(finding regulation prohibiting
physician to seek compensation outside of Medicare did not constitute interference).
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IV. THE NEED FOR COST CONTROLS IN HEALTHCARE AND FOR THE MEDICARE
PROGRAM
Medicare and its associated entities are insurances that function under the
auspices of the federal government.85 All workers are required to pay tax into the
Medicare system.86 These individuals fund the current system and the health needs of
the dependent elder population.87 Medicare spent about $336.4 billion on health care
in 2005.88 This number has risen from $27.6 billion for the national total cost of
health care at Medicare’s inception in 1965 and is projected to increase to $4 trillion
by the year 2015.89 President Bush highlighted this impending insolvency of the
Medicare programs when he presented his budget calculations for 2009.90
No one can dispute that the cost of medical care in America has skyrocketed
beyond the pocket books of most United States citizens.91 Multiple factors contribute
to this increase.92 Obvious reasons for the increase include advanced and expensive
technology, greater availability of functional drugs, general inflation, and costs of
medical liability.93 The most obvious reason is that people are living longer, albeit
with more illness.94
Another problem that complicates cost control efforts is that unrestrained
payment has led to a system of entitlement.95 Prior to the advent of adequate
medications that effectively treated infection96 and permitted significant pain

85

See supra notes 42-46.

86

Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), 26 U.S.C. § 3101 (2004).

87

See Crossley, supra note 13, at 77-78.

88

See supra note 1, at 16.

89

Id. at 4-5.

90
Proposed 2009 National Budget: Economic Assumptions and Analyses: Health
Spending 188, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2009/pdf/apers/
assumptions.pdf.
91

HOGUE, supra note 3, at 304-05; BARLETT, supra note 3, at 306.

92

Id. at 311-315.

93

Id.

94

John V. Jacoby, Consumer-Directed Health Care and the Chronically Ill, U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 531, 563 (2005) (“Providing health care services to people with chronic illnesses
consumes about 75 percent of direct health care costs.”); see also Maria Cheng, Living
Longer, Healthy Cost More, THE PLAIN DEALER, February 5, 2008 at A3.
95

HOGUE, supra note 3, at 304; Theodore Marmor et al., The Future of Medicare, Post
Great Society & Plus-Choice: Legal & Policy Issues: Medicare &P Political Analysis:
Omissions, Understandings, & Misunderstandings 60, WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1137, 1145-48
(2003).
96
Antibiotics such as Penicillin became popular in the 1940’s. Mary Bellis, The History of
Penicillin, available at About.com: Inventors, http://inventors.about.com/od/pstartinventions/
a/Penicillin.htm?p=1.
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control,97 people sought medical aid only when they were truly sick and local
remedies would not suffice.98 Hospitals were places for the homeless or the
terminally ill to die in relative comfort.99 Over the past century, society has embraced
the need for preventive care.100 People are now encouraged to see a medical provider
to screen for illness because treatment of any illness prior to its physical
manifestation allows for greater survival and comfort.101 However, this practice also
encourages use of medical resources and thereby increases expenses.102 The increase
of individuals diagnosed with chronic diseases has lead to long-term dependence on
medical resources for continued treatment to improve survival and, hence, become a
long-term cost burden.103
In general, the lack of personal affordability has generated the risk-based
insurance industry, including the Medicare entities.104 However, even the cost of
insurance premiums has become unaffordable for some Americans.105 Employers
once offered to cover all the cost of health insurance for employees as a benefit.106
Federal law has since mandated that health insurance be subsidized by certain
employers.107 This health care includes separate entities: one for on-the-job injuries
in the form of workers compensation,108 and another for general health coverage for

97
Anesthesia medications such as Morphine which became popular in the 1800’s. See
generally BARBARA HODGSON, IN THE ARMS OF MORPHEUS: THE TRAGIC HISTORY OF
LAUDANUM, MORPHINE AND PATENT MEDICINES (Firefly Books 2001) (presenting an
interesting history of Morphine).
98

See, e.g. History of Hospitals, http://web.bryant.edu/~ehu/h364proj/fall_97/prier/
index.htm.
99

Id.; HOGUE, supra note 3, at 182.

100

Nat’l Ctr. For Policy Analysis, Is Preventive Medical Care Cost-Effective? *1, (1995),
available at http://www.ncpa.org/ba/ba188.html.
101

Id.

102

Id.

103

Jacoby, supra note 94, at 564 (describing the high cost of diabetic patients and
progressive disease prevention). Also, consider patients with HIV, prior cancer, or pregnancy
prevention.
104

HOGUE, supra note 3, at 304-05.

105

BARLETT, supra note 3, at 16.

106

Id. at 309.

107

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 29 U.S.C. § 1182
(1996); see also Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §
1001 (1984).
108

Worker’s Compensation is provided through state statutes and is intended to provide
strict liability for employers toward injured employees during the course of employment.
MILLER, supra note 5, at 202; Norman Singer, 3B Sutherland Statutory Const. § 75:3 (6th ed.
2007).
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the workers and their families.109 The development and maintenance of pension
funds is highly contentious in labor negotiations involving large companies, because
projected costs of medical coverage for retired employees are beginning to outweigh
the costs for the current work force.110 Companies are essentially paying non-workers
a benefit without the return benefit of labor. These costs are limiting the types of
health insurance and other benefits that companies can offer to current employees.111
Traditionally, both private and public health insurance entities have been able to
defray cost by spreading it over many individuals.112 Premiums paid for by all
covered individuals, many of whom are healthy, offset the payouts for those who
become ill.113 In general, the insurance industry is a risk-based entity because there is
theoretically a risk that the insurance may need to pay more than it charges.114 Most
insurers try to recoup the losses and maintain profits by minimizing this risk.115
Insurers may minimize risk by “increasing premiums, [by] lowballing claims, or
[by] cherry-picking their customers to void those who pose the greatest threat to their
bottom lines.”116 Another way for insurers to control costs is to pay less for care of
their customers.117 This is done by negotiating with medical providers to obtain
across-the-board discounts on fees charged.118 This practice shifts the differential
burden of cost onto the uninsured or other insurances.119 Insurers also create
monetary incentives for customers to be seen only by a limited number of preferred

109
In the form of private insurance companies or through self-funded health care
insurance. MILLER, supra note 5, at 521-27.
110

HOGUE, supra note 3, at 309; see, e.g. Anne P. Birge, The Pending Crisis in EmployerProvided Health Benefits for Retirees: Are Tax Breaks for Employers the Answer?, 19 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 797, 798 (1992/1993).
111
See, Lori Myers, Employers Cutting Back on Health Benefits for Retirees, 22 CENT.
PENN BUS. J. 7 (July 14, 2006) (available at Westlaw 2006 WLNR 13835511) (noting that
many employers are freezing or terminating retiree benefits because of a desire to protect
active employee benefits. The employers observe that retirees have access to federally
mandated Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 4980(b) (West 2006), or Medicare benefits.)
112

HOGUE, supra note 3, at 305; Crossley, supra note 13, at 77- 79.

113

Id.; see also David D. Griner, Paying the Piper: Third-Party Payor Liability for
Medical Treatment Decisions, 25 GA. L. REV. 861, 869-70 (1991).
114

Id.

115

Id.

116
David Lazarus, Insurers Taking Risk Out of the Equation, L.A. TIMES, October 26,
2007, available at http://www.latimes.com/features/health/la-fi-lazarus26oct26,1,6704461.
column?coll=la-headlines-health&ctrack=1&cset=true.
117
BARLETT, supra note 3, at 15 (noting that private health insurances and Medicare
entities negotiate for large volume discounted rates that pay only a fraction of the cost).
118

Id.; Griner, supra note 113, at 871-74.

119

See also Griner, supra note 113, at 871-74.
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providers who are specifically chosen because of their billing practices or acceptance
of lower fees.120
However, even a cursory review of relevant statistics 121 reveals that the
proportion of workers available to fund Medicare, compared to the number of ever
increasing number of beneficiaries, will result in the Medicare fund’s insolvency by
2019.122 Therefore, costs must be contained and/or other sources of revenue
identified to preserve the system.123 Despite this reality, beneficiaries continue to
demand and expect expansion of the program.124 The federal government appears
eager to comply with these desires as noted by the recent passage of the
pharmaceutical provisions in Medicare Part D despite readily acknowledged funding
shortfalls.125
Government officials have considered a variety of cost containment options for
the Medicare program.126 Currently, the program employs target cost containment by
decreasing payment for services to hospitals and providers, by shifting some costs
onto private insurances, and by collecting variable premiums from insureds who can
afford to pay them.127 Medicare also controls payments by closely reviewing medical
records and verifying that only covered services are reimbursed.128 CMS has an
extensive waste and abuse department that constantly evaluates possible fraudulent
schemes to obtain illegal payment and vigorously prosecutes and imposes heavy
fines on wrongdoers through its administrative procedures.129 Medicare has been

120

Id.

121

The IOM authors have used a form of “extrapolated reality”. Extrapolated means
“inferred (unknown information) from known information.” The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language 254 (Paperback Ed. 1976). “Extrapolated reality” occurs
when data is inferred from a known source and then treated as true data. See, e.g., supra note
100.
122

Social Security & Medicare Boards of Trustees, supra note 31, at *1.

123

Id.

124

Id.; see also Joseph R. Antos, Ph.D., Fixing the New Medicare Law #2: How to
Promote Real Medicare Cost Containment, 1752 Backgrounder (The Heritage Foundation
April 26, 2004), available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/bg1751.cfm
(noting a premium increase for Part B where the amount is calculated based upon a
beneficiaries personal income as a method of cost containment); see generally Marmor, supra
note 69.
125

Id.

126

See, e.g., Gail R. Wilensky, The Balanced Budget Act: A Current Look at its Impact on
Patients & Providers, Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MPAC) Testimony (July 19,
2000), available at http://www.medpac.gov/publications/congressional_testimony/071900.pdf.
127

Id.

128

Kevin Freking, Audits Sting Hospitals, Physicians, AOL NEWS (March 1, 2008)
available at http://news.aol.com/story/_a/audits-sting-hospitals-physicians/n2008030103520
9990015.
129

See generally HHS Office of the Inspector General, available at http://www.oig.hhs.
gov/fraud.html.
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accused of overly vigorous prosecution of innocent errors which government
officials recognize as common occurrences due to the extremely complicated coding
systems Medicare employs.130 Nonetheless, “cost savings” from payment refusal and
fines have been generally well received.131
Another cost saving measure is refusal to pay for certain services. Generally,
Medicare will not pay for services that it deems to be “unnecessary.”132 Recently
Medicare officials have refused to pay for services that they identify as medical error
in the form of a preventable adverse event. 133 By self-defining the problem,
Medicare officials are able to control hospitals and providers by refusal of payment.
Medicare officials expect to save about $30,000 on average per hospital stay for each
preventable adverse event, and estimate a savings of twenty million dollars in the
first year.134
V. THE ADVENT OF THE PREVENTABLE ADVERSE EVENT
Over the past two decades, political attention has been focused upon the
escalating cost of medical care, and the recognition of preventable adverse events as
a contributing factor of this cost.135 CMS has defined seventeen adverse events that

130
Jane Cys, Bush on Health Fraud: Physicians Hope for Lighter Touch, AM. MED. NEWS,
Feb. 26, 2001, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2001/02/26/gvsb0226.htm
(describing angry physician groups’ response to heavy-handed tactics that punish
unintentional mistakes resulting in a criminalization of the practice of medicine); see also
Fraud & Waste in Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, at A30, Aug. 1, 1997 (“The truth is that [CMS] has
neither the financial nor the ability to tightly supervise the numbingly complex system.”).
131
Id. (describing a cost savings of $1.5 billion, $840 million from civil actions in 2001).
However, punishment for over-billing has not always been the norm. Historically, Medicare
would not reimburse for mistakes made for under-billing due to erroneous coding. Rather, if
an under-billed mistake was found, Medicare refused payment if the request for payment had
passed the 90 day time limit for submissions. Therefore, to prevent under-billing, many
providers over-billed Medicare because of uncertainty in the billing codes, claiming similar
codes assuming that Medicare officials would choose the appropriate code and disallow the
duplicates without penalty.
132
Medicare does not cover: acupuncture, dental care, care outside of the US, most
chiropractic services, cosmetic surgery, custodial care (unless skilled nursing), eyeglasses
(except after cataract surgery), hearing aids (except certain implants), long-term care, personal
care, and private duty nursing. Medicare Rights Center, http://www.medicarerights.org
/medicareanswersonline.html (last visited December 2, 2007).
133

CMS Quarterly Provider Updates, CMS-1533-P § F, 72 Fed. Register 85 May 3, 2007,
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/quarterlyproviderupdates/donloads/cms1533p.pdf. The
range of expected savings is $24,962 for surgery on the wrong body part, wrong patient or
wrong surgery to $88,781 for ventilator assisted pneumonias as average costs associated per
hospital stay.
134
Id.; See John H. Ferman, Payments Will be Based on Quality not Quantity *1, 23/2
HEALTHCARE EXECUTIVE 52 (March 1, 2008), available at Westlaw, 2008 WLNR 5128153.
135

The increased attention toward serious adverse events may be traced to the IOM study
of 1995. See Kohn, supra note 2.

2008]

TO PAY OR NOT TO PAY

107

are candidates for non-payment when they occur in the hospital setting.136 Ten of
these events are slated for non-payment beginning October 2008 and include
catheter-associated urinary tract infections, stage III and IV pressure ulcers, vascular
catheter-associated infections, certain surgical site infections (such as mediastinitis
after coronary artery bypass graft, bariatric and orthopedic surgeries), falls or trauma
resulting in serious injury, blood incompatibility, air embolism, manifestations of
poor glycemic control (such as ketoacidosis and diabetic coma), deep vein
thrombosis and pulmonary embolism and foreign objects left during surgery.137
Another seven conditions are under consideration for future non-payment and
include Staphylococcus Aureus septicemia, ventilator-associated pneumonia,
Clostridium Difficile-associated disease, Legionnaires’ disease, iatrogenic
pneumothorax, delirium, and surgical site infections after knee or varicose vein
surgeries.138
These events were first catalogued in 1995 when the Institute of Medicine
(IOM)139 published an article entitled “To Err is Human: Building a Better Health
System.”140 The article was the first in a series of congressionally commissioned
reports regarding the quality of health care in America.141 By reviewing data
collected and published from two separate case review studies that considered
adverse events in four hospitals,142 published statistical data from the American
Hospital Association and a conglomerate of adverse drug event collectives,143 IOM
convincingly proposed that the analyzed data revealed an unacceptable quality of
care at hospitals.144 IOM calculated that if the data from these hospital and drug

136
See CMS, Hospital Acquired Conditions, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
HospitalAcqCond/06_Hospital-Acquired_Conditions.asp (last visited Sept. 10, 2008); see also
Doug Trapp, AMA Meeting: Delegates Decry CMS No-Pay List as Unrealistic and Call for
Revision, AM. MED. NEWS, July 7, 2008, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/
amednews/2008/07/07/prl20707.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2008).
137

Id.

138

See Trapp, supra note 136.

139

The IOM is an entity established by the government to perform “independent” research
upon medical issues as directed by the government. It is indirectly funded by the government.
Its purpose is to gather information regarding a chosen topic then present the findings to
Congress which it publicizes. See The Nat’l Acad., History of the Nat’l Acad., available at
http://www.nationalacademies.org/about/history.html.
140

Kohn, supra note 2.

141

Id. at xi.

142

Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events & Negligence in Hospitalized
Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I, 324 N. ENG. J. MED. 370-76, 1991;
see also Lucian L. Leape et al., The Nature of Adverse Events in Hospitalized Patients: Results
of the Harvard Medical Practice Study II, 324 N. ENG. J. MED. 377-84, 1991; Eric J. Thomas
et al., Incidence & Types of Adverse Events & Negligent Care in Utah & Colorado, 38(3)
MED. CARE 261-71, 2000.
143
144

Kohn, supra note 2, at 15-16.

Id. at 1, 26. This maneuver demonstrates the term “extrapolated reality” such that data
from three studies in three states amounting to only 45,000 admissions have been extrapolated
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studies were extrapolated to include the thousands of hospital admissions throughout
the United States, then between 44,000 and 98,000 the patients die each year from
medical errors in health care.145
As is often the case with data analysis, the report contained several critical errors.
It failed to define a “mistake,” and included all unexpected or complicating
conditions as identifiable errors, regardless of whether the events were caused by
negligence or were merely a common side effect of adequate care.146 The study also
included patient controlled errors, such as injuries that occurred when a competent
patient refused to follow direct medical advice.147 In addition, the study evaluators
admitted that the data is biased and limited, but despite this the evaluators urged
congressional involvement and immediate action.148
Although the conclusions were admittedly ambiguous,149 ill-defined,150 nonscientific and non-reproducible,151 the staggering numbers of allegedly avoidable
adverse incidents reported in this article gained the attention of Congress and the
Clinton administration, resulting in a call to action based upon these results.152 The
IOM article coined a variety of ambiguous terms, such as “preventable adverse
event,” which it defined as a medical error that results in injury.153 The article also
redefined common terms such as “safety” to mean “freedom from accidental
injury.”154 By creating and redefining key terms and then interpreting data utilizing
these new definitions, IOM’s conclusions were severely skewed.155

to apply to 33.6 million admissions to the entire U.S. population over a period of a single year,
1997. See Harrington, supra note 21, at 334; see also supra note 121.
145

Id.

146

Kohn, supra note 2, at 35-36; see also Harrington, supra note 21, at 331-33, 334-35,
343-45.
147

Id.

148

Kohn, supra note 2, at 53.

149

Id. at 28; see also Harrington, supra note 21, at 331-33, 335, 344.

150

See Kohn, supra note 2, at 28.

151

Harrington, supra note 21, at 333, 340-45, 363 (noting that the reporting systems’ data
reveal substantially fewer numbers at only “slightly more than one percent” of the IOM
projected adverse event rate).
152
Id. at 349-50; see also The President’s Health Security Plan: The Complete Draft and
Final Reports of the White House Domestic Policy Council, TIMES BOOKS (1993).
153

Kohn, supra note 2, at 4; Adverse event has multiple definitions. See, e.g., Children’s
Mercy Hospitals and Clinics, What is an adverse event?, available at http://www.childrensmercy.org/stats/definitions/AdverseEvent.htm. In medicine, examples of an adverse event
include such entities as medical errors, unexpected injuries, additional diagnosis, or
aggravation of existing conditions. See Harrington, supra note 21, at 341-45.
154
Kohn, supra note 2, at 4; safety is commonly defined as “freedom from danger or
injury.” THE AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 620, PAPERBACK ED.
(1981).
155

Harrington, supra note 21, at 334-35.
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Unfortunately, this IOM article has become the basis for the identification and
management of the current quality control “crisis.”156 Consumer groups and other
national offices have been established specifically to address “preventable adverse
events.”157 The term has been received with incremental name changes that gradually
have come to signify medical error as their sole cause.158 These same events have
been renamed “serious adverse events,” which signifies any event where a patient
suffers death or bodily injury while interned in a hospital, and ultimately “never
happen events,” which are defined as events that should never happen in the hospital
setting.159 Over time, these adverse events have been collectively redefined as
medical error.160
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2006 established several methods intended to lower
the federal deficit and reduce federal spending.161 One of those methods relies on the
concept of “preventable adverse events” to redefine the payment system for
Medicare and related entities.162 The Secretary of Health and Human Services is
required to select at least two common medical “events” that meet three criteria.163
The chosen event must be high cost or high volume, result in assignment of a higher
payment for the associated diagnosis-related code (DRG),164 and represent a

156

The article is repetitively cited by successive reviews of quality measures and news
articles.
157
Such as The Nat’l Quality Forum (NQF), the Quality Improvement Professional
Research Organization, and The Leapfrog Group to name a few.
158
Harrington, supra note 21, at 338-39, 341-42 (addressing hindsight bias where
retrospective review of outcome tends to impute presumptive knowledge of causation and
exclaiming “Yet, the IOM could not have been naïve as to its choice of the term error, with its
pejorative connotation and its potential for misuse by those with a political or economic
agenda. Despite the IOM’s focus on system failures, the term error suggests blame.”). Id. at
344.
159
Id. at 347-50. Discussion of the progression from simple adverse events to medical
errors is a separate topic for later review but reading the successive IOM quality reports and
studies that cite these reports is illuminating if not time consuming.
160
Id. at 338-39; see, e.g., Robert Pear, Clinton to Order Steps to Reduce Medical
Mistakes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2000, at A1 (replacing “adverse events” with the terms
“mistakes” and “medical errors”); see also Am. Med. Assoc. (AMA) Opinion, Medicare’s NoPay Conditions: Not Always Preventable, AM. MED. NEWS, July 14, 2008, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2008/07/14/edsa0714.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2008)
(recognizing “never events” as a “misnomer that … creat[e] an unrealistic standard of
perfection”).
161

Deficit Reduction Act Pub. L. No. 109-171(s1932), 120 Stat. 4 (2006).

162
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ww(d)(4)(D) (West 2007). Other methods in the Deficit Reduction
Act involved direct decrease of payment to hospitals and providers for services.
163

Id.; The Secretary not only met but also exceeded the Congressional mandate by
choosing ten events.
164
Id. The DRG is a coded number assigned to a specific diagnosis ostensibly for billing
purposes. MILLER, supra note 5, at 506-07. It may be modified by additional codes describing
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condition that “could reasonably have been prevented through the application of
evidence based guidelines.”165
Arguably, certain specific events are presumed preventable, such as an
unintended foreign body retained after surgery or blood type incompatibility during
transfusion.166 However, most of the listed events are not always reasonably
preventable by any measurable standard, and causation is indeterminable or
compounded by complexity of existing disease and surrounding circumstances.167
Thus, physicians and hospitals have decried that the proposed non-payment scheme
is fundamentally flawed because eight of the ten triggering events are not
preventable by following evidence-based procedures and are intended to hold
providers to an unrealistic level of perfection.168
VI. THE PROPOSED SPENDING SCHEME
The proposed payment schedule that CMS will impose upon the health care
system represents a new condition with which hospitals must comply to maintain
funding from Medicare programs.169 This new condition includes denial of payment
for medical services if these services are generated by the occurrence of any of the
defined preventable adverse events.170 CMS officials have concluded that refusal of
payment is appropriate because these events are considered by Medicare and others
to be events that should “never happen” in health care.171

associated circumstances such as adverse events. Id. It defines a prospective payment system
where payment is determined prior to services rendered. Id.
165

42 U.S.C. §1395ww(d)(4)(1)(D)(iv). It should be noted that the guidelines require that
the event only be “reasonably” preventable which is a subjective and ambiguous term when
applied to medical science. Dolinar, supra note 56, at 406-07. Nonetheless, the events would
be 100% non-payable thus acknowledging by design that the hospital will be denied payment
for non-preventable occurrences.
166

Only in the most emergent of cases where careful preparation is not possible would
these events be understandable.
167

Trapp, supra note 136; J. James Rohack, MD, AMA Disappointed in HHS Decision to
Add New Conditions to Hospital No-Pay List, Statement on Am. Med. Assoc. website, July
31, 2008, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/print/18817.html (last
visited Sept. 9, 2008) (“To be reasonably preventable, there should be solid evidence that by
following guidelines, the occurrence of an event can be reduced to zero or near zero”).
168

Id.

169
Id. This condition is imposed along with proposed direct cuts in both hospital and
provider reimbursement.
170
171

Id.

Id. The implications of naming any event as an “error” or a “never happen” entity are
obvious. It is uncertain how these names and views of “preventable” errors will impact the
medical malpractice arena. It is probably safe to assume that increased blame followed by
increased litigation is inevitable. See Harrington, supra note 21, at 343-346, 353-355 (noting
the relationship of perceived error to increased litigation and fear of expected litigation as a
barrier to reporting). The scheme is likely based upon a theory of contract where a party is not
obligated to pay for services that are erroneously performed. Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) §§ 2-314, 2-315 (West 2004) (warranties of merchantability and fitness). However,
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The stated purpose for the imposed fee non-payment is two-fold. Medicare
officials first claim that the non-payment for identified “never happen” events
(hereafter preventable adverse events) will promote accountability and quality.172
Second, Medicare officials claim that the non-payment measure is a means to
improve cost control by not paying for unexpected and preventable medical care.173
While this reasoning makes sense in the abstract, its application to real world
medical settings raises a number of troublesome issues.
One major issue is whether this new payment scheme is rationally related to the
existing goals of quality improvement through increased accountability and cost
containment. It has long been established that the federal government, through its
designated administrative agencies,174 has constitutional authority to utilize its
spending power to regulate entities of national interest.175 Health care involves every
United States resident regardless of location, age, or nationality. Specifically, care
for the elderly, disabled and poor is provided through the actions of the national
Social Security programs such as Medicare.176 Thus, the proposed non-payments
may be directly authorized through use of constitutional spending power, but there
are certain limits.177
VII. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO IMPOSE THE SPENDING SCHEME:
A. Authority
Congress has the authority to officially delegate power to CMS as an
administrative agency.178 CMS exists under the auspices of the Department of Health
and Human Services.179 This department is headed by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, who is appointed by the President and approved by the Senate per
Constitutional protocol.180 Therefore, the power of CMS to enact law is derived
directly through the legislature. Congress has authorized the existence of CMS

patient beneficiaries are not merchandise, and needed health care services are not always
predictable or preventable.
172

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ww (West 2007) which was entitled Quality Adjustment in DRG
Payments for Certain Hospital Acquired Infections when it was amended by Pub. L. No. 109171(s1932), 120 Stat. 4 (West 2006).
173

Id.

174

DHHS and CMS.

175

This power is generally obtained through authority granted in the commerce and
spending clauses of the constitution. See U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 1 & 3; see, e.g., ERISA, 29
U.S.C. § 1001 (1984) (declaring that benefit plans affect interstate commerce and involve the
Federal taxing power).
176

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395c (West 2008).

177

See infra notes 178-83.

178

42 U.S.C.A. 1395kk (West 2008); see Am. Med. Assoc, 429 F. Supp. at 1193.

179

See supra note 42.

180

See supra note 43.
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through its regulation of commerce.181 Through application of the spending power
and associated conditions for promised payment, CMS has established the power to
regulate and control hospitals within the United States.182
B. Restraints
1. Intrinsic
One intrinsic restraint on the authority of CMS to regulate medical care is found
in the text of the Medicare Act.183 Specifically, the first paragraph of the Act declares
that actions of CMS are “not to be construed as practicing medicine.”184 Nonetheless,
the degree of involvement in medical decision-making, as discussed in Section II of
this note, strongly suggests that CMS has violated this restraint.185 The practice of
medicine is generally defined by state licensing boards, which determine the scope of
permissible practice and discipline for violators.186 Challenges to this federal restraint
have been rejected on the grounds that federal forays into the practice of medicine
are justified by the police power to protect the general health and welfare.187 This
makes sense, of course, when federal authority is taking action that in fact protects
the public.188 But as explained throughout this note, the Secretary’s exertion of power
in declaring nonpayment for certain adverse effects may severely undermine the
public’s interests related to the availability and quality of health care in this country.
2. Extrinsic: Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments; Punishment and Coercion
Federal power to regulate hospitals and the health care system has been
challenged through claims of extrinsic restraints such as the Tenth and Fourteenth

181

Id.

182

See Leavitt, supra note 75, at 5 (noting CMS’ aim to “[p]ay in a way that expresses our
commitment to supporting providers and practitioners for doing the right thing,” and to
‘become an active partner in driving the creation and use of evidence about the effectiveness
of healthcare technologies … to help doctors and patients use the treatments we pay for more
effectively”).
183

42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1965).

184

Id.

185

See supra notes 75, 182.

186

Collins v. State of Texas, 223 U.S. 288, 288 (1912) (finding osteopathic physicians
subject to licensing provisions).
187

See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (finding that physicians who
medically assist terminally ill patients to suicide is unlawful even though state act authorized
the process).
188

fire.

Obvious examples would include traffic regulations, and the prevention of crime or
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Amendments.189 These challenges have sought to retain the sovereignty of the state
police power190 and suggest private individual resistance to increased taxation.191
In general, challenges to CMS decisions based on Fourteenth Amendment
Procedural Due Process violations have proven unsuccessful because notice and
hearing opportunities are preserved.192 However, the fairness and objectivity of these
processes has been questioned.193
Other extrinsic restraints on the power of the federal government to regulate
hospitals involve limiting Congressional power when it reaches the level of coercion
or punishment.194 The Supreme Court has held that government agencies may not use
constitutional authority to coerce implementation of programs when those programs
are purely punitive195 or do not have a rational relationship to the specified
governmental interest.196 However, the line between coercion and induced
cooperation is vague.197 Although the Court specifically held in United States v.

189

See infra notes 190, 193.

190

In one such Tenth Amendment challenge, West Virginia v United States Dept. of
Health & Human Serv., 289 F.3d 281 (2002) (rejecting a Tenth amendment challenge to a
condition of participation that required states to use their police power to recover Medicaid
funds from estates of deceased individuals).
191
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937) (ruling against a Tenth amendment
challenge to the Social Security Act that was brought by a company share holder in an attempt
to invalidate the imposed tax on employers to help fund the program. The Court held that
Congress could utilize its spending power to favor the general welfare at the expense of states
and citizens).
192

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 702 (West 2008). In general,
administrative law applies where the “rules themselves provide adequate notice of regulatory
requirements.” Charles H. Koch, Jr., Procedural Due Process, 1 ADMIN. L. & PRAC. § 2.20,
[3] ¶ 3 (2007).
193
See, e.g., Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 101, 104 (1994) (finding that
the Secretary for DHHS could impose conditions of participation that require hospitals to
apply generally accepted accounting principles but the DHHS need not apply these same
principles when calculating hospital loss).
194
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68-71 (1935). The Supreme Court has held that the
spending power of Congress may not be used solely for coercive or punitive purposes but
must be rationally related to promotion of the general welfare. Even the dissent, written by
Justice Stone agreed that “the threat of loss, not hope of gain, is the essence of coercion.” Id.
at 81. Therefore, in view of the strong need for cost controls, and the unequal distribution of
power in negotiation (government v. Hospital or provider) this condition truly represents a
form of coercion. Coercion is defined as “[c]ompulsion by force” or “[c]onduct that
constitutes the improper use of economic power to compel another to submit to the wishes of
one who wields it. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 110 (3d POCKET ED. 1996).
195

Butler, 297 U.S. at 72.

196

Id. at 73. Justice Roberts states that “[t]he power to confer or withhold unlimited
benefits is the power to coerce or destroy. [Thus, for] coercion by economic pressure [t]he
asserted choice is illusory.” Id. at 71.
197
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (upholding a federal condition to
funding for state roads only if states cooperated by imposing alcohol restrictions upon minor
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Butler that a choice between cooperation and survival represents coercion,
subsequent Court decisions have not uniformly reached that conclusion.198
This dilemma is most evident in the realm of education. The dependence of
educational institutions upon federal financial aid is proven by the paucity of
independent institutions that are able to survive without it.199 However, acceptance of
federal financial aid necessarily includes acceptance of a wide range of federal
regulations that tend to make the federal government an active manager in school
operations.200
The analogy between private institutions of higher education and America’s
hospital system is clear, because the majority of hospitals are dependent upon federal
funds for survival, as are the majority of institutions of higher learning.201 Federal
regulation of both private and public schools has led to federal control of education
through conditioned acceptance of necessary funds.202 Similarly, federal regulation of
hospitals leads to federal control over health care through conditioned funds.203 As
the Court in Fullilove v. Klutznick declared, “[t]his court has repeatedly upheld
against constitutional challenge the use of [conditioned funds] technique to induce
[local and state] governments and private parties to cooperate voluntarily with
federal policy.”204 Nonetheless, the Court has subsequently mandated that conditions
attached by Congress to receipt of federal funds must bear some relationship to the
purpose of federal spending as a minimum scrutiny review.205 Therefore, the
Congressional power of regulation as presented through CMS must have some

and adult individuals under the age of twenty-one whether they used the roads or not). This
case highlights the power of the federal government to directly evade the voting power of the
adult citizenry by subverting state power through financial inducement. The Court did apply a
three part test to determine whether the federal government could impose this condition upon a
state but it did not give the same test to the individual citizen who would ultimately be
affected by the condition. Id.
198

United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68-71 (1935); see, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448 (1980) (finding constitutional use of Congressional spending power as a means to
uphold The Public Works Employment Act of 1977 that required a percentage of minority
workers).
199
See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Indep. Sch. (NAIS), School Facts at a Glance (2001-2007),
http://www.nais.org/files/PDFs/NAIS_Facts_at_a_Glance_2001-2002.pdf (noting only 9901145 schools nationwide).
200

See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
201

Dolinar, supra note 56, at 406.

202

Eugene Hickok, Ph.D. & Matthew Ladner, No. 2074 Backgrounder (Heritage Found.
Wash., D.C.), June 27, 2007, at 2 (citing Barry Goldwater, Conscience of a Conservative:
Some Notes on Education, 77-81 (1960)).
203

Dolinar, supra note 56, at 398, 403.

204

Fullilove, 448 U.S at 474.

205

See, e.g., New York v United States 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992); Nevada v. Skinner, 884
F.2d 445, 447 (9th Cir. 1989).
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rational relationship to the purpose of CMS, which is to provide medical coverage to
the beneficiaries of the program.206
VIII. RATIONAL RELATIONSHIP OF NON-PAYMENT AS A MEANS TO QUALITY AND
COST GOALS
A. Is the Payment Scheme Rationally Related to Quality Promotion?
It is highly speculative whether a scheme that denies payment of specific
frequent and costly adverse events is rationally related to the stated goals of quality
improvement and cost control. At first blush, the payment scheme appears to be
related to quality control because only adverse events that reduce quality are
affected.207 The refusal of payment for these events also appears to be rational
because punishment for wrongful events represents a well-recognized method of
inducing behavioral change.208 Thus, by punishing a hospital for undesirable adverse
events, Medicare will arguably induce the hospital to avoid the occurrence of these
events.209
Upon further reflection, however, the proposed non-payment is not rationally
related to the goal of quality control for at least five reasons. First, the health system,
including hospitals, has been radically changing its response to preventable adverse
events since the IOM study brought the issue to light in 1995.210 Many changes
regarding compilation of data and reporting of events have resulted in on-going
improvements.211 However, these improvements are limited by the costs of some
procedures, such as increased number and training of staff, or costly investments in

206
Guernsey, 514 U.S. at 112-13 (finding that the “purpose of Medicare reimbursement
[is] to provide payment of the necessary costs of efficient delivery of covered services to
Medicare beneficiaries.”); but see Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Assoc., 476 U.S. 610, 626-27 (1986)
(finding that administrative agencies enjoy a “presumptive regularity” where that is not
equivalent to minimum rationality under due process analysis).
207

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ww (West 2008).

208

See William M. Sage, The Role of Medicare in Medical Malpractice Reform, 9 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 217, 224 (2007) (describing the impact of conditional spending
penalties as a means to promote quality in healthcare); see also Christopher, supra note 17
(describing punishment theories of consequentialism and retributivism as avenues to induce
change).
209

Sage, supra note 208, at 224.

210

See, e.g., Kevin O’Reilly, Medicare’s No-Pay Events: Coping with the Complications,
AM. MED. NEWS (July 14, 2008), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2008/07/
14/prsa 0714.htm (noting the costly measures employed to successfully decrease pressure sore
incidence including special mattress purchases, increased nursing protocols) (last visited Sept.
9, 2008); see generally American Hospital Association, www.aha.org. (detailing the American
Hospital Association’s quality reform initiatives) (last visited Sept 9, 2008).
211
See generally Inst. of Med. (IOM), at http://www.iom.edu/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2007);
see also Nat’l Quality Forum (NQF), http://www.qualityforum.org/ (providing examples of
quality data and reports) (last visited Jan. 1, 2007).
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modern computerized reporting systems.212 Therefore, punishing an entity, such as a
hospital that is already striving to improve quality within real limits of cost and
personnel, is not rational because the punishment will not cause the improvements to
occur faster and may compound the difficulty in improving quality, especially for
those institutions that are already struggling financially.
Second, the measures that are cited as adverse preventable events are neither well
defined nor entirely preventable, as discussed above.213 It is difficult to imagine how
100% punishment for prevention of events that are less than 100% preventable will
improve quality.214
Third, punitive measures already exist for preventable adverse events and they
provide strong incentives for health care providers to monitor quality of care.215
These measures include the court system.216 Medical malpractice is well-established
in the United States as a deterrent to wrongful actions and has produced significant
economic compensation for many wrongly injured patients.217 The malpractice

212

Samantha Chao, Advancing Quality Improvement Research: Challenges &
Opportunities-Workshop, 27-36 (2007), available at http://www.iom.edu/CMS/3809/
38607/43175.aspx; see also Inst. of Medicine, Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health
System for the 21st Century (2001) available at http://www.iom.edu/CMS/8089/5432.aspx
(describing the need for changes throughout the hospital system in order to improve quality).
213
See supra notes 148-50. For example, surgical site infections are never completely
avoidable even when performed in an ultra-clean operating room because complete sterility of
the room is impossible. See Ronald K. Woods, M.D., Ph.D. & E. Patchen Dellinger, M.D.,
Current Guidelines for Antibiotic Prophylaxis of Surgical Wounds, 57/11 Am. Family
Physician 2731, 2733 (1998), available at http://www.aafp.org/afp/ 980600ap/woods.html
(noting wound cleanliness classifications). Also, many surgeries are performed on
contaminated organs such as bowel or vagina. Id. at 2735-36. No matter how much
disinfectant or antibiotics are used, these areas are rarely able to be sterilized and, therefore, a
certain number of infections are normally anticipated. Id.
214

Especially because hospital and providers have both noted that fears of punishment for
unfavorable results has been a constant barrier to compilation of quality reports. See Chao,
supra note 212, at 27-36.
215
See Janet Rae Brooks, US Legislatures Drive Accountability Measures, 178(6) CMAJ
671, 671-72 (2008), available at http://www.cmaj.ca/cgi/content/full/178/6/671?ck=nck
(noting that state legislatures through state medical boards and malpractice litigation are
powerful accountability agents).
216

Id.

217
Many would argue that the Malpractice system is broken because it does not provide
adequate legal redress for many injured beneficiaries. See Kohn, supra note 2, at 110
(“Liability is part of the system of accountability and serves a legitimate role in holding people
responsible for their actions.”). However, this non-payment scheme would harm the
beneficiary in two ways. First, the scheme is designed to ensure that Medicare receives
damage payment before the injured beneficiary by simply refusing to pay for services
rendered. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ww (West 2008). Second, this scheme effectively places the
beneficiary in an even more vulnerable legal position by removing the powerful insurance
company as a possible third-party to malpractice claims and placing the full cost of litigation
upon the single injured individual. The Malpractice system may be broken but reforms are in
progress and it is the best system available to the beneficiary. See generally David A. Hyman
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system functions so well for this purpose that fear of litigation has been declared a
primary cause of increased costs associated with health care and malpractice
insurance.218 Further economic punishment for events that were in fact avoidable
further drains the limited economic resources available to hospitals to improve health
care for all patients and is, therefore, not rational.
Fourth, the plan to refuse payment for services already rendered for unspecified
lengths of time would ultimately be deleterious to the health system. The ubiquitous
and often crushing financial burden that hospitals bear for providing uncompensated
services has resulted in hospital closings, consolidations, and limitations of offered
services.219 As the number of non-paying patients and inadequately compensated
services increases, this burden will only worsen.220 Therefore, creating another
category of uncompensated service that is recognized as being both frequent and
costly, will only add to this burden. Thus, further burdening the health care system
by refusing payment for needed services at a time when the financial costs are
critical and out of control is not rational.
Lastly, the plan to refuse payment for needed services that are required because
of specified preventable adverse events is ultimately deleterious to the primary
beneficiaries. By refusing to pay for needed medical services, Medicare has recreated
the conditions that spurred implementation of the Medicare programs.221 The
beneficiary becomes an indigent, non-funded patient who requires free care.222
Therefore, because the hospital is responsible for providing care at its own expense,
it is likely that it will choose the least costly method that accomplishes the needed
service. Thus, the patient beneficiary loses choice of treatment options and is not

& Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation & Tort Reform: It’s the Incentives, Stupid,
59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1086 (2006).
The proposed non-payment scheme reveals self-interest for recovery of money damages at
the expense of the beneficiary.
218

Chao, supra note 212, at 27-36; see also Harrington, supra note 21, at 353-54.

219

See, e.g., Lebedinski, supra note 81, at 155; DHHS, Health Res. & Serv. Admin., The
Office of Rural Health Policy Celebrates 20 Years: A Look Back at the History of the Office &
its Cont. Mission to Improve Health Care in Rural Am., (2007) (noting 400 hospital closings
from 1983-87), available at http://ruralhealth.hrsa.gov/pub/historyofORHP.htm; Tim
Bonfield, Ohio Hospitals Face Stress: Closings Raise Fears about Quality, THE CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, 01A, August 20, 2000, available at http://www.enquirer.com/editions/
2000/08/20/loc_ohio_hospitals_face.html.
220

Hospitals are prohibited from refusing care to patients based on their ability to pay. See
Rawlings, supra note 64, at 295.
221
222

42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1965).

Moreover, Medicare specifically prevents the hospital from billing the patient
beneficiary for services rendered when those services are related to the preventable adverse
event. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(a)(1)(A) (West 2008). The hospital then is effectively providing
these services for free. However, it is not clear how long this free service must be provided
and whether other related entities such as providers, laboratories, other ancillary services and
follow-up care are also affected. Furthermore, resulting issues of reimbursement for follow-up
care needed at other facilities is in question such as other hospitals, providers or even
rehabilitation or long term care facilities.
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even permitted to offer to negotiate or pay for upgraded services.223 The payment
scheme is not rational because it will ultimately harm the beneficiary and subvert the
primary purpose of Medicare.
B. Is the Payment Scheme Rationally Related to Cost Savings?
Medicare officials’ determination to tie non-payment with outcome by refusing
to pay for certain adverse events appears to be rationally related to its goal of cost
control because the retained funds theoretically become available to cover other
services. However, this non-payment scheme is ultimately not rational because it will
inevitably result in increased cost. Like the issues related to the purported increase in
quality of health case, there are many reasons to doubt that the nonpayment system
will realize actual savings.
First, the proposed plan will induce increased diagnostic tests.224 One of the
criteria for inclusion in the non-payment scheme is that the adverse event is
preventable.225 Therefore, if the diagnosis, such as an infection, is present upon
admission, the resultant event of infection may be considered to be pre-existing and
hence reimbursable.226 If not identified upon admission, however, the treatment
necessitated by an infection discovered subsequent to admission may be construed
by Medicare officials as a preventable adverse event, and hence not reimbursable.227
Hospital officials have already declared that they will be screening each admission
for pre-existing conditions, and will then be able to appropriately expect
reimbursement for the condition if it worsens during the hospital stay.228 These
screening tests frequently involve invasive procedures such as blood tests or swabs
of painful wounds or personal body parts.229 Hospital officials will, of course,
appropriately bill Medicare for this admission testing.230 Therefore, the decision to

223
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395a (West 2008); United Seniors Assoc. v. Shalala, 2 F. Supp. 2d
39, 41-43 (1998) (finding that Medicare beneficiaries had no free choice of providers and
upholding § 4507 of the 1997 Balanced Budget Act that prohibited any physician who
participates in negotiation with a beneficiary outside of Medicare, agrees to forego receiving
Medicare reimbursement for two years).
224

The practice of defensive medicine where additional tests are performed is recognized
as a means to defend or prevent malpractice claims. HOGUE, supra note 3, at 313.
225

See supra note 167.

226

Id.

227

Id.

228

See supra note 165; see also O’Reilly, supra note 210, at *3 (noting that many
hospitals are increasing energy and cost to obtain documentation for pre-existing conditions as
a protective measure against the payment scheme).
229

Blood tests are invasive because they necessarily require needle sticks while swabs of
wounds are generally painful or require cavity invasion. Urine production is not always
possible on admission therefore catheterization to obtain the specimen is not only invasive but
also another risk for infection.
230

42 C.F.R. § 412.2(c)(5) (1994); see, e.g., Victoria Stagg Elliott, Rapid MRSA test gets
FDA OK, AM. MED. NEWS (Jan. 28, 2008), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amed
news/2008/01/28/hlsb0128.htm (noting the anticipated approval for new technology that will
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refuse to pay based on outcomes is not rational because it will increase preventative
and diagnostic costs and unnecessary procedures for its beneficiaries.
Second, Medicare will directly increase administrative costs to implement the
refusal of payment for rendered services.231 The scheme will require increased
review of discharge records and increased defense of payment refusals. Certainly, the
increased revision of records will require greater time and effort. Also, hospitals will
challenge these non-payments frequently, especially when there is ambiguity
regarding cause or pre-existence of the event.232 Therefore, Medicare is actually
increasing its administrative costs, as well as that of hospital administrators, by
refusing payment thus representing an irrational cost control measure.
Third, an increase in civil liability based on refused payment for recognized
needed and many times emergent services may result.233 In recent years, the courts
have permitted litigation against insurance companies and found civil liability when
the companies wrongfully refuse to pay for medically indicated services.234 By
refusing to pay for these services, patient care may be compromised because of cost,
patient choice of therapy will be decreased because of cost and further injury may
result thereby costing even more. Therefore, the proposed payment plan is not
rational because Medicare will be increasing its liability to providers and patients,
such that defense and litigation resulting from this liability will ultimately increase
costs.235

quickly and accurately test for infection upon admission). It not hard to see that this test would
be easily applied to every likely patient upon admission as a way to detect pre-existing carrier
status.
231

This result is completely expected because no program of this nature may be enforced
without review for compliance and associated costs. One need only note the creation and
funding of the QIO which exists to “encourage” quality improvements. See Leavitt, supra note
75, at 4. The government also funds reviews of the QIO that evaluate whether the program is
accomplishing its mission. Id.
232

Hospitals have recently been awarded $666 million in settlement for wrongful
reimbursement policies. See Heather Won Tesoriero, Hospitals Get $666 Million from
Medicare Settlement, WALL STREET JOURNAL, March 13, 2008, at B7. Medicare claims an
exposure cost of $2.8 billion. Id. The hospitals had to sue twice over nearly 30 years in order
to receive payments legally due them. Id.; see In re. Medicare Reimbursement Litigation, 414
F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied 547 U.S. 1054 (2006); see also Cabell Huntington Hosp.,
Inc. v. Shalala, 101 F.3d 984 (4th Cir. 1996).
233

Judicial review of Medicare prospective pay determinations is prohibited by statute. 42
U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(7) (West 2007). CMS also isolates its decisions from review by requiring
that administrative remedies be exhausted prior to court appeal. MILLER, supra note 5, at 510.
However, the Supreme Court refuses to review Medicare cost report validity. See Your Home
Visiting Nurse Serv., Inc. v. Shalala, 525 U.S. 449 (1999).
234

Griner, supra note 113, at 896; but see MILLER, supra note 5, at 583-85 (discussing
current debate and variable decisions regarding liability of third-party payers).
235

See supra notes 233-34. This is also because civil rights groups have utilized the legal
system as a means to force governmental change. See generally Batchis, supra note 6.
Therefore, it is not unforeseeable that beneficiaries may seek to sue providers as a means to
facilitate a change in CMS policies. Id. More likely, the federal government will immunize
itself from civil lawsuits that result from its Medicare reimbursement decisions thereby
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Fourth, CMS officials contend that the proposed non-payment is required
because of an emergent need for cost control within the national Medicare system
that specifically chooses adverse events that represent significant cost.236 CMS
officials cite the amount it spent on these occurrences, implying that this amount
would be the savings to Medicare when the non-payment measures are employed.237
However, CMS officials neglect to mention that subrogation of funds for some
serious adverse negligent events is accomplished through malpractice awards.238
Therefore, the actual loss to Medicare for these litigated events in terms of billing
and legal expenses is unknown and possibly small. Furthermore, if no liability is
found the hospital should conceivably be permitted to receive payment for its
services. Theoretically, the only events that would not involve entitled
reimbursement through litigation would be those that are not negligent and therefore
not malpractice.239 The problem with the proposed non-payment scheme arises
because Medicare chooses to bypass litigation and constitutionally guaranteed rights
of Due Process by unilaterally subjecting the health care party to punishment for
ambiguous adverse events that Medicare defines to be per se medical errors.240
Therefore, claiming a cost savings for reimbursed expenses is not rational.
Fifth, the federal government already is required to provide emergency grants
and tax relief to hospitals that are financially burdened to offset debt created by
under-payments and required provision of uncompensated services to community
indigent patients as charity care.241 By refusing to pay for more services, Medicare
has contributed to this crisis.242 Therefore, costs will ultimately be increased
indirectly because this uncompensated care will fall within the reported hospital

creating a program that is unaccountable to those it affects: providers and beneficiaries.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895D(2) (1979).
236

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ww(d)(4)(D) (West 2008).

237

See O’Reilly, supra note 210, at *4 (anticipating a savings of $22 billion in 2007 for
non-payment of eight adverse events); see also supra note 133.
238
Guillermo Gabriel Zorogastua, Improperly Divorced from Its Roots: The Rationales of
the Collateral Source Rule and Their Implications for Medicare and Medicaid Write-Offs, 55
U. OF KAN. L. REV. 463, 469-70 (2007).
239
This theory is derived from the recognized purpose for medical malpractice litigation
where punishment is imposed for wrongful, negligent actions by providers but avoided for
reasonable care. See generally Hyman, supra note 217.
240

See Harrington, supra note 21, at 343, 351 (noting that the adverse event occurrence
would be classified as an error despite lack of determination of causation). Logically, this
scheme would encourage beneficiary litigation against providers even though the risk (e.g. a
surgical infection) was explained before surgery and is a common complication that is not
always avoidable simply because Medicare has informed the patient that a medical “error”
with monetary value has occurred.
241

See, e.g., Cecilia M. Jardon McGregor, The Community Benefit Standard for NonProfit Hospitals: Which Community, and for Whose Benefit?, 23 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 302, 312, 325-26 (2007) (discussing the favorable tax exemptions for charity write-offs
and Medicare reimbursement for bad debt deductibles).
242

Id.
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charity or bad debt claims and will increase the federal subsidy requirement.243 In
short, the government may just be shifting the cost of this care from one federal
account to another, rather than avoiding it altogether.
Sixth, cost will be incurred because beneficiaries who are faced with a designated
adverse event would effectively join the ranks of the underinsured, facing nonpayment for pre-existing conditions.244 This problem is exacerbated because
hospitals are not allowed to bill patients for needed services related to this allegedly
preventable condition, and thus the hospital will not even realize partial recovery of
the imposed loss.245 This possibility greatly weakens the patient and empowers the
hospital.246 Involved health care entities could dictate care based upon minimal
affordability for an acceptable outcome whereby patients would lose all power to
negotiate for alternative care options.247 Because the health care provider knows that
Medicare will not reimburse for the care of a person suffering from the allegedly
preventable condition, the beneficiary will effectively revert to the pre-Medicare
insurance status.248 The patient may be shuffled between facilities in an effort to
share the burden, be given only minimal care, or simply choose to avoid care to
avoid the resultant confusion.249 Therefore, the proposed payment scheme is
irrational because it defeats the primary purpose of Medicare by placing the
beneficiary in the same or worse position than had Medicare never come into
existence.250
IX. CONSEQUENCES: SETTING A NEW PRECEDENT?
It is well-recognized that federal legislation causes many unintended
consequences for hospitals and providers, beneficiaries, and for third-party payors.251

243

Id.

244

See, e.g., Crossley, supra note 13, at 76.

245

See supra note 79.

246

Ironically this is one rationale for creating Medicare originally. See Brief Summaries of
Medicare and Medicaid, supra note 1.
247

Furthermore, because Medicare has not defined its payment policies regarding care for
these events as provided by other hospitals, nor for how long this non-payment penalty will be
imposed if chronicity develops. The patient beneficiary and future hospitals will remain with
uncertainty as to which services will be paid such as for a later presenting adverse event that is
only recognized when the patient is admitted to another facility. Which facility will Medicare
not pay, the hospital where the event occurred or the one who is billing and treating? Would
one hospital be forced to repay the other? Would the hospital where the adverse event
occurred be forced to sustain losses for subsequent admissions? Outpatient care? Home health
care? How long? How much? How many?
248

See, e.g., Crossley, supra note 13, at 76.

249

Id. at 146 (noting cost conscious care decisions would likely pre-empt cost effective

ones).
250
251

See supra Part II.B.

See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, Am. Health Care & the Law-We Need to Talk!, 19(4)
HEALTH AFFAIRS 84-106 (2000), available at http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/409824
_print.
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The consequences of refusal to pay for services rendered based upon a hindsight
determination of cause will likely be considerable.252
Consider the elderly beneficiary who falls at a hospital and suffers a hip fracture.
The fall may be due to any number of reasons including hospital negligence, such a
liquid spill on the floor, well intended but ultimately disastrous efforts by a friend or
relative to “help” the patient, or patient noncompliance with a doctor’s order to
remain in bed who willfully neglects to call for assistance. Regardless of the cause,
this injury requires additional medical intervention.253
According to the proposed CMS payment scheme, the additional medical care
required will be non-reimbursable.254 Therefore, despite the serious injury, this
needed medical care is provided free of charge at the hospital’s expense.255
The care would be free because hospitals generally provide needed care to an
injured patient regardless of whether they are paid for these services.256 That is what
hospitals and doctors do for a living; they provide care to injured people whom they
call patients.257 Aside from the recognized professional duty to care for a patient
regardless of pay status,258 hospitals as business entities are statutorily prevented
from refusing care to patients once they are admitted to the hospital.259 Therefore, the
patient beneficiary will receive medical care for the injury regardless of cause or pay
status.
Problems arise when these needed services are refused payment. CMS officials
admit that the never happen events were chosen as events worthy of non-payment
because of their high frequency of occurrence and large cost.260 These events,
including patient falls, may improve with preventative measures but they will not
cease because preventative measures do not prevent 100% of falls.261 That is why
many falls are also sometimes considered to be unavoidable accidents.262 Therefore,

252

See Harrington, supra note 21, at 338-39.

253

Medical intervention may include procedures, such as imaging x-rays, MRI or CAT
scans, physician orthopedic consultation, possible surgical correction, increased nursing care,
additional medications, and a prolonged hospital stay with physical therapy after admission,
and so on.
254

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ww(d)(4)(D) (West 2008).

255

See supra note 222.

256

Id.; Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C.
1395dd(a) (2003).
257
See James Gaulte, Retired Doc’s Thoughts: Physician Fiduciary Duty – A Thing of the
Past?,
http://mdredux.blogspot.com/2007/06/physician-fiduciary-duty-thing-of-past.html
(August 8, 2007) (describing the widely recognized fiduciary duty to treat).
258

See MILLER, supra note 5, at 280-302.

259

EMTALA, 42 U.S.C. 1395dd(a) (2003).

260

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ww(d)(4)(D) (West 2007).

261

See, e.g. Richard W. Sattin et al., The Incidence of Fall Injury Events Among the
Elderly in a Defined Population, 131-6 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1028 (1990).
262
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patient falls will occur. Study of these events, including their root cause,263 is
currently under way.264 However, the data of quality assessments throughout the
United States has barely begun to be systematically gathered, much less
comprehensively and competently analyzed.265 Therefore, CMS officials are
categorically refusing to pay for events that include some unavoidable accidents,
preferring to shift this financial burden to hospitals.266
The consequences of this cost shift could be enormous. Hospitals, especially
those that provide indigent care or rely upon minimally-reimbursed public insurances
such as Medicare and Medicaid, are already struggling to survive.267 In the broken
hip scenario described previously, the cost of expensive surgery and prolonged
rehabilitative care may well exceed any reimbursable expense related to the initial
cause for admission.268 The hospital will in effect be providing free services to the
patient at its own expense.269 Therefore, the proposed non-payment scheme will only
further jeopardize the financial stability of these institutions.270
The anticipated consequences to the beneficiary are likewise considerable. The
beneficiary is effectively reduced to an indigent status.271 The greatest impact of this
reduction in status to the beneficiary will be upon choice.272 The hospital is required
to provide adequate services at its expense, but it is not obligated to provide a choice

263

“A root cause of a consequence is any basic underlying cause that was not in turn
caused by more important underlying causes.” SIX SIGMA DICTIONARY (2005), available at
http://www.isixsigma.com/dictionary/Root_Cause-61.htm.
264
See, e.g. The Nat’l Quality Forum (NQF), available at http://www.qualityforum.org/,
and The Leapfrog Group, available at http://www.leapfroggroup.org/, which are both
performing health care quality data compilation and analysis.
265
See QIO, supra note 71, at 10 (noting that standardization of reported data is still
problematic); Harrington, supra note 21, at 366 (noting that data collected via state reporting
systems is “plagued by inconsistent, vague and cumbersome reporting formats).
266

See generally, Trapp, supra note 136.

267

Lebedinski, supra note 81, at 154-55.

268

See supra Part IX.

269

This is especially true because the hospital is specifically prevented from charging the
beneficiary as a condition of acceptance. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ww(d)(4)(D) (West 2008).
Furthermore, hospitals may claim the cost incurred as bad debt and reclaim some funds
through tax abatement. See Lebedinski, supra note 81, at 155. Therefore, it can be argued that
the cost may simply be shifted to a different federal agency or extra Medigap insurance once
debt is acknowledged.
Consider also the fate of the physicians involved. They may also not be paid for their
services and expenses. To control these events, hospital privileges may be tied to occurrences
or litigation may ensue such that a provider found to be at fault will pay the hospital. Staff
discipline may be weighted upon incidence of these events and so on. See generally MILLER,
supra note 5, at 237-64.
270

See also supra Part II.B.

271

See supra notes 222, 250.

272

See supra Part II.B.
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among adequate services.273 Therefore, questions arise regarding whether the patient,
who now is classified as a non-payer, will be given any meaningful choice on critical
issues such as conservative therapy versus surgery, type or style of medical device
used, or length of stay after the unexpected procedure.274 Moreover, the patient
beneficiary may also lose the choice of facility. Consider the confusion that would
arise if the patient chooses to leave the hospital that caused the injury and decides to
seek care at a different facility. Would the new facility then be paid for the services
or would it be forced to provide services at its expense? Could the new facility seek
payment from the facility charged with the event? If these services are reimbursed at
a different facility, then offending hospitals will be encouraged to shift patients to
other facilities for prolonged care.275 If the care is not reimbursed, then the patient
becomes an undesirable non-paying entity and may be shuffled between facilities to
avoid the cost of care.276 Either way, the patient is caught in the middle without the
power to choose or to control his or her medical destiny.
CMS officials anticipate that one of the consequences of enacting this nonpayment scheme is that other insurance companies will adopt similar nonreimbursement practices for events the companies deem preventable.277 This
anticipated consequence is based upon historical evidence that other insurance
entities follow Medicare’s lead regarding reimbursement methods.278 However,
refusal to pay for recognized medically indicated services is not a new theory in the
private insurance world.279 Private insurances have long established that costs
incurred by pre-existing conditions are not reimbursable by the insurance if they
were specifically denied coverage pursuant to the terms of the insurance contract or
if the insured did not fully disclose the pre-existing condition.280

273
Patients in general are due only a standard of care that is reasonable to the patient’s
condition as defined by malpractice law. See MILLER, supra note 5, at 591-92; see e.g.,
Goodman v. Sullivan, 712 F. Supp. 2d 334 (S.D. N.Y. 1989) (denying payment for an MRI).
274

Id.

275

This is akin to patient dumping which EMTALA was designed to prevent, EMTALA,
42 U.S.C. 1395 (2003).
276

Id.

277

See Campbell, supra note 14.

278

Id.

279

See generally Crossley, supra note 13 (discussing the effects of risk selection and
underwriting as well-recognized and accepted insurance policies to decrease cost).
280
Id.; see, e.g., Aetna Small Group Sales, North Central Region, What You Need to Know
About HIPAA & Its Impact on the Availability & Portability of Health Coverage, Aetna
Broker Briefing, (2002), available at http://www.aetna.com/producer/data/Federal_
HIPAA_and_Aetna_October_2002_FINAL_DRAFT.pdf (defining preexisting condition as
“[a]n illness or injury for which medical advice, diagnosis, care, or treatment was
recommended or received during the six-month period immediately prior to the date the
member first becomes covered by the plan (i.e., the lookback period), or the six-month period
immediately prior to the first day of a required employee waiting period, if any.”).
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Indeed, refusal to pay for costs incurred by pre-existing medical conditions is a
recognized cost control measure well known to the insurance industry.281 This
measure has resulted in a new class of “under-insured” beneficiaries in the United
States as some individuals with serious or chronic diagnoses such as cancer,
epilepsy, asthma, or diabetes find themselves with no medical coverage for
complications from these serious medical ailments.282 Therefore, if private insurers
adopt the CMS non-payment scheme for preventable occurrences, even persons with
otherwise comprehensive health coverage will find themselves in the ranks of the
uninsured related to treatment of the excluded event.283
Historically, beneficiaries contract with an insurance entity to obtain medical care
for needed unforeseen injuries.284 Beneficiaries do not contract with insurance
entities to become an indigent-like patient merely because the insurance decides that
the specific injury is an adverse preventable event.285 After all, the beneficiary is the
entity most affected, not only by the injury itself but also by the refusal to reimburse.
The beneficiary did not contract to become injured or to lose choice of treatments
and coverage of that treatment.286 This scenario effectively leaves the vulnerable,
privately-insured beneficiary in the middle of provider and payor disagreements.287
Therefore, should the private insurance companies follow Medicare’s lead, which
appears quite likely, contractual obligations will likely be challenged or changed to
reflect this non-payment scheme.288
Furthermore, Medicare may well be setting a dangerous medical insurance
precedent.289 This precedent will allow third-party payors to refuse payment for
needed medical services when they deem that injuries have been caused by some
preventable event.290 The basic issue then is converted to the need for a clear
definition as to what level of prevention is required before an adverse event becomes

281

See EMERIC FISHER ET AL,, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW 839 (Rev. 3d ed. 2006).

282

Id. at 148-49.

283

This would set a new government approved precedent whereby private insurances may
refuse to pay for contracted services because of the preventable component of any disease.
This practice has been described as discriminatory especially when applied to factors of race,
age, sex, genetics, mental illness, and victims of domestic violence. Crossley, supra note 13, at
85-107.
284

See Crossley, supra note 13, at 78-80 (citing insurance as a risk reduction entity
purchased to protect against unpredictable medical risk).
285

HOGUE supra note 3, at 305. This is the risk based rationale for insurance in general.

286

Id.

287

Id. at 122-23 (describing cost-shifting mechanisms to insured employees such that the
beneficiary bears a greater responsibility to pay for services).
288
See O’Reilly, supra note 14 (noting that the BlueCross BlueShield Assn. is currently
phasing in new coding and claims processes to reflect a no-payment regimen for “never
events”).
289

See supra note 285.

290

See Crossley, supra note 13, at 134.
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non-reimbursable. Consider the current societal emphasis upon preventive care and
lifestyle change.291 By refusing to pay for preventable injuries, a medical insurance
provider or employer may begin to examine the beneficiary’s lifestyle.292 The
beneficiary may prevent lung cancer if he or she stops smoking.293 A beneficiary may
prevent incurable breast cancer if she undergoes an annual mammogram.294 Diabetes
may be prevented by losing weight,295 and heart disease may be prevented by regular
exercise.296 It has been well-recognized that general definitions may be expanded and
redefined over time.297 The evolution of the definition of serious adverse events is
only one example.
Therefore, it is not inconceivable that refusal to pay for preventable injuries or
illnesses of any kind may become common insurance risk-avoidance practice once
the precedent is set. Also, this refusal to pay for lifestyle choices may soon be
reflected, if not already employed, by large employers who refuse to hire people who
smoke or are obese as a means to decrease their medical insurance premiums.298
These actions would effectively shift the high cost of medical care onto the
beneficiary, if he or she does not comply with lifestyle requirements that prevent

291

See Nat’l Ctr. For Policy Analysis, supra note 100.

292

See Crossley, supra note 13, at 134 (noting that one rationale for cost-sharing is to
“giv[e] Americans incentives … to take greater personal responsibility for the consequences of
their health-related behavior”).
293

DHHS, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, TARGETING TOBACCO USE:
THE NATION’S LEADING CAUSE OF PREVENTABLE DEATH (2008), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/publications/aag/osh.htm.
294
DHHS, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, PREVENTING AND
CONTROLLING CANCER: THE NATION'S SECOND LEADING CAUSE OF DEATH (2008), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/publications/aag/dcpc.htm.
295
DHHS, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, DIABETES: DISABLING
DISEASE TO DOUBLE BY 2050 (2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/publications/
aag/ddt.htm.
296

DHHS, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, DIVISION FOR HEART
DISEASE AND STROKE PREVENTION: ADDRESSING THE NATION'S LEADING KILLERS (2008),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/publications/AAG/dhdsp.htm.
297

See, e.g., Shimon Edelman & Bo Pederson, Linguistic Evolution through Language
Acquisition (2002) (book review), available at http://www3.isrl.uiuc.edu/~junwang4/langev/
localcopy/pdf/edelman04bookreview.pdf.
298
Employers are already refusing to hire individuals who engage in lifestyle choices that
adversely affect their health. Three large employers, The Cleveland Clinic, Scotts Miracle-Gro
Company, and Medical Mutual have already proclaimed that they will not hire smokers.
Cleveland Clinic Bans Hiring of Smokers, COLUMBUS DISPATCH: OHIO’S GREATEST ONLINE
NEWSPAPER, June 28, 2007, available at http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/local_news/
stories/2007/06/28/clinic_smokers.html?print=yes (last visited Sept. 10, 2008); see also
Michael Siegel, Smokers Deemed Unsuitable for Employment at the Cleveland Clinic, THE
REST OF THE STORY: TOBACCO NEWS ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY, July 3, 2007, available at
http://tobaccoanalysis.blogspot.com/2007/07/smokers-deemed-unsuitable-for.html (last visited
Sept. 10, 2008).
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disease.299 Those costs would eventually be re-shifted to health care providers and
possibly back to the federal government.300
The unintended and far reaching consequences of Medicare’s new non-payment
scheme could negatively affect all citizens of the United States. Not only could the
non-payment scheme alter the fundamental nature of medical care reimbursement
but also affect lifestyle and fundamental freedom of choice.301 The proposed
spending scheme may encourage third-party payers to coerce beneficiaries into
performance of specified personal actions that are determined to be preventative of
disease by way of financial pressure.302 In this manner, the spending power of
Congress may influence and be echoed by the spending power of the health
insurance industry in general. And all of the issues previously discussed will
become even more exaggerated if Medicare officials determine in the future to
expand the list of uncovered “avoidable” events.303
X. THE PUBLICATION DILEMMA: INCREASED QUALITY OR INCREASED COST?
The IOM article has appropriately focused legislators, insurances, hospitals,
providers, and beneficiaries upon the issue of quality care in America.304 This focus
has spurred efforts by all stakeholders to find improved methods of health care
delivery.305 Studies are currently under way that evaluate and quantify the effects of
various quality measures such as hand washing, electronic charting, and improved
communication between care givers.306 These efforts should identify common areas
and cooperative methods of improvement so that serious adverse events are
minimized.
Current legislation has mandated that all hospitals and providers submit specific
data, including root cause reasons for the occurrence of the preventable adverse
events in question, to the newly created Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ).307 Also, various private groups are collecting data and analyzing the

299

See supra note 292.

300

This circular theory would be accomplished through charity or bad debt subsidies. See
Lebedinski, supra note 81, at 155.
301

See supra note 292.
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Id.
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Medicare officials are already considering adding the remaining nine categories noted
in Part V. See Part V.; see also Trapp, supra note 136.
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See supra Part IV.
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Id.
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See, e.g., National Quality Forum: Projects, http://www.qualityforum.org/projects/ (last
visited October 30, 2008) (presenting current ongoing projects); see also National Quality
Forum, Safe Practices for Better Healthcare 2006 Update, (2006), available at
http://www.qualityforum.org/publications/reports/safe_practices_2006.asp.
307
See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 5001, 120 Stat. 4 (2006);
CMS, Nat’l Coverage Determinations with Data Collection as a Condition of Coverage:
Coverage
with
Evidence
Development,
htp://www.cms.hhs.gov/mcd/ncpc_view
_document.asp?id=8 (July 12,2006); AHRQ, From the Field, Sharing Experience and
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results.308 However, to be valid, the data must be uniform and thus comparable.309 So
far, difficulty has arisen regarding different methods of reporting, different
definitions of reported information, and different methods of analysis.310 Despite
these inconsistencies, publication of this data is intended and expected.311
A. How to Use Publicized Quality Data?
One of the most contentious recommendations of the original IOM report
regarding serious adverse events is that of mandatory reporting and publication of
hospital quality data.312 This contention is grounded in the malpractice debate.313
Payors, such as Medicare and private insurance companies, contend that publication
of this data will provide valuable insight and tools to improve care of beneficiaries.314
Providers, especially physicians, contend that publication of this data will fuel
litigation and malpractice claims by spotlighting possible errors.315 Both appear to be
theoretically correct. The contentious issue is not about how the data is used in the
medical community for improved patient care but rather about how the data is used
in various legal forums, especially civil courts.316
In theory, publication of quality data especially regarding the root cause of
serious adverse events should allow better analysis of causation.317 This analysis

Findings
From
AHRQ-Funded
Projects,
http://healthit.ahrq.gov/portal/server.pt?
open=512&objID=650&PageID=0&parentname=ObjMgr&parentid=106&mode=2&dummy=
/index.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2007).
308
Such as the Leap Frog and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations (JCAHO). See Harrington, supra note 21, at 355-66 (reviewing various
reporting systems).
309
Id.; see DAVID LEBLANC, STATISTICS: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS FOR SCIENCE 4-8
(2004) (discussing what constitutes valid data), available at http://books.google.com/books?id
=gtawVU0oZFMC&printsec=frontcover&dq=what+is+valid+data+in+scientific+study#PPR3,
M1.
310

See supra notes 308-09.

311

See Leavitt, supra note 75, at 14 (noting the QIO’s “focus on making publicly available
measures of provider performance on its Compare website”).
312

Kohn, supra note 2, at 87-88. The report recommends mandatory reporting for data
regarding serious adverse events and voluntary reporting for near miss events.
313

Harrington, supra note 21, at 353.

314

Kohn, supra note 2, at 98l see also Harrington, supra note 21, at 351.

315

Harrington, supra note 21, at 353-54; see , e.g., also Robert Pear, Experts Cast Doubt
on Medical Reporting Plan, N.Y. TIMES, February 23, 2000, at A12, available at 2006 WLNR
16593293.
316
Physicians are also concerned about publication because of reputation damage and
threatened job security after adverse publicity. Harrington, supra note 21, at 352-55 (noting
that even a minor error can jeopardize a physician’s career).
317
Kohn, supra note 2, at 98; see also Joanne Stow, Using Medical-Error Reporting to
Drive Patient Safety Efforts, 84 ASS’N. OPERATING ROOM NURSES J. 406 (2006), available at
2006 WLNR 16593293.
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should suggest ways to improve and further prevent these devastating and tragic
events.318 Publication would also facilitate discussion between facilities that would
permit hospitals to learn from one another’s mistakes in a peer review fashion.319
However, this altruistic vision would be more believable if access to care and
reimbursement were not adversely affected by the cost savings goals associated with
the data.320 Using this public information specifically for cost savings goals allows
the data to be used as a weapon in the malpractice arena as a method for third-party
payors to claim repayment for treatment associated with possible medical errors.321
This increase in repayment represents a decrease in risk and a one-sided cost savings
because the third-party payor would be able to more efficiently avoid loss for
payment of unexpected services rendered.322 In this way, the cost burden of an
adverse event is shifted to the provider (or beneficiary) and away from the thirdparty payor.323 Therefore, cost savings by the payor represents cost increase to the
provider and is justified by public review of publicized data.324
An additional cost amplifier is the anticipated increase in litigation expected from
review of unqualified data.325 This increase would likely come from both third-party
payors and patients.326 Publication of unqualified material that suggests the
occurrence of a medical error or malpractice will inevitably become fodder for
personal injury claims, perhaps even class actions.327 These cases would only be
strengthened by Medicare or other third-party payors’ refusal to pay for care that is
deemed erroneous in a per se fashion and then informing the patient beneficiary of
this decision through billing information or quality reporting prior to protest by the
hospital.328 Therefore, wide spread publication of quality data will likely lead to a
cost shift where payors further shift the cost burden onto hospitals and providers.

318

Kohn, supra note 2, at 98; see also Stow, supra note 317.
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Kohn, supra note 2, at 181-82; see also AHRQ, From the Field: Sharing Experience
and Findings from AHRQ-Funded Projects, http://healthit.ahrq.gov/portal/server.pt?open=512
&objID=650&PageID=0&parentname=ObjMgr&parentid=106&mode=2&dummy=/index.ht
ml (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
320

See generally Crossley, supra note 13.
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Harrington, supra note 21, at 353-55. The information is also available for increased
risk selection and underwriting practices. See generally Crossley, supra note 13.
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See Crossley, supra note 13, 75-77.
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Id.
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Harrington, supra note 21, at 343-44; see also Pear, supra note 316.
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See supra note 325.
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See supra note 326; see generally Batchis, supra note 6 (noting that lawsuits are an
acceptable and effective way to change legislative policy and to obtain damages for patients).
328

See supra note 240.
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B. Increased Cost with Increased Quality?
Furthermore, improved quality does not necessarily lead to decreased cost.329 In
actuality, improved quality may demand increased cost.330 The current debate about
mandated electronic records is an example.331 CMS officials and private quality
groups have all recognized that electronic records would allow faster and more
efficient exchange of medical information between hospitals, providers and thirdparty payors.332 However, this technology is expensive to implement and confusing
to learn, especially when different systems are unable to communicate.333 The cost of
implementing a nationwide system that functions as a cohesive unit is
astronomical.334
Furthermore, many serious adverse events are determined to be the result of local
factors related to poor funding. Understaffed nursing personnel, outdated machinery
in the laboratory or imaging departments, and other factors contribute to substandard
care.335 No hospital system desires to be understaffed or outdated.336 Nonetheless,
cost concerns must be addressed and contained if the hospital is to survive.337
Mandated conditions for reimbursement that require expensive upgrades would
burden the struggling hospital on a limited budget and commandeer funding

329

See, e.g., AHRQ, Conference on Health Care Data Collection and Reporting:
Collecting and Reporting (2007), available at http://www.amia.org/inside/initiatives/health
data/ 2007/ahrq_datareport.pdf.
330

Id.

331

President Bush has established a Health Information Technology (HIT) initiative
whereby electronic medical records are mandated to be available by 2014. The HIT initiatives
are to be administered through DHHS. See United States Dept. of Health and Human Services:
Federal Health Architecture (FHA), http://www.hhs.gov/fedhealtharch/background.html; see
also Cathy Tokarski, Medical Error-Prevention Strategies Face Barriers to Acceptance,
MEDSCAPE MONEY & MED. (2000), http://www.ahrq.gov/news/medscap2.htm.
332
See generally PAUL SHEKELLE ET AL., COSTS AND BENEFITS OF HEALTH INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY: EVIDENCE REPORT/TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT NO. 132 (prepared by the
Southern California Evidence-based Practice Center under Contract No. 290-02-0003) (2006),
available at http://www.ahrq.gov/downloads/pub/evidence/pdf/hitsyscosts/hitsys.pdf.
333

Id. at 57 (listing six challenges of data collection and measurement). Consider the
software communication problems between extensive program systems such as Microsoft and
MacIntosh.
334
Id. Also consider the many systems already in place that would need to be changed to
become compatible with a national system. In general, hospitals and providers are expected to
support the cost of implementing these changes.
335

See, e.g., THE 2007 STATE OF AMERICA’S HOSPITALS-TAKING THE PULSE: FINDINGS
FROM THE 2007 AHA SURVEY OF HOSPITAL LEADERS (American Hospital Ass’n 2007),
http://www.aha.org/aha/content/2007/PowerPoint/StateofHospitalsChartPack2007.ppt#404,1,
Slide 1.
336

See generally Protecting the Promise (American Hospital Ass’n 2004), supra note 81.

337

Id. at 14.
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priorities such as staffing issues.338 Therefore, if the quality data is used to impose
conditional expenditures for technological advancement and conformity, the cost
increase may exceed the value of the quality improvement because CMS, as a thirdparty payor, would likely prioritize hospital budgets.339
C. Patient Choice Based on Quality Data
Another stated intent of publication of quality data is to allow the patient
beneficiary, as a health care consumer, to make informed decisions when choosing
between health care facilities.340 However, this stated intention ignores the obvious:
health care delivery and consumption are not completely akin to merchandise sales.
Health care generally begins with the doctor-patient relationship, not a hospitalpatient relationship.341 The patient may have no choice as to which facility his or her
physician admits patients.342 Therefore, once a disease is identified that requires
hospitalization, the patient necessarily attends the hospital where the physician has
privileges or the patient must choose another physician and establish another doctorpatient relationship on short notice.343 It is well-established that the trusted doctorpatient relationship is a powerful entity that drives patient satisfaction, compliance
and response to care.344 Therefore, patient choice of facility will truly only be a
choice factor if the doctor-patient relationship is voided or physicians are able to
admit and service several facilities.345
Patient beneficiaries are further deprived of meaningful health care choices
because some insurance companies determine which hospitals they prefer and will
maximally reimburse through preferred provider determinations.346 Thus, the

338

Id. at 11 (noting the nursing shortage with 110,000 vacant registered nurse (RN)
positions in 2004 and a projected shortage of 800,000 RN’s in 1012).
339
Id. at 14 (noting that capital budgeting is necessary in order to balance staffing
shortfalls and technical modernization needs required by HIT).
340
See Leavitt, supra note 75, at 14 (noting the intent to publicize quality measures to
allow “greater transparency of information on quality and cost for consumers…”).
341

See MILLER, supra note 5, at 280-83. Patients such as the uninsured who generally seek
medical care through hospital emergency rooms or clinics would form a hospital-patient
relationship first.
342

Id. at 226 (noting that physicians must apply for and be appointed to a medical staff of
hospital).
343

A patient may obtain a physician through the hospital emergency room where a
physician “on call” will be assigned. MILLER, supra note 5, at 284-85.
344
See Scott Forehand, Helping the Medicine Go Down: How a Spoonful of Mediation can
Alleviate the Problems of Medical Malpractice Litigation, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 907,
920 (1999).
345

If the doctor-patient relationship is valueless, then it would not matter to which hospital
a patient is admitted because any suitably knowledgeable physician will suffice. However, the
obvious difficulty of physicians who have privileges in multiple hospitals is the limited ability
to be physically present at more than one place at a time.
346

See Griner, supra note 113, at 872-73.
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publicized data may serve the needs of the insurance company as to which hospital
organizations to reimburse as “in network” facilities more than it would aid patients
who may prefer an “out of network” facility.347
Furthermore, many health emergencies depend upon speed of care as obviated by
the existence and use of the ambulance as an emergency vehicle. Ambulance
services are generally required by statute to transport patients to the closest facility
capable of dealing with the emergent situation.348 These services generally do not
show preference based on quality data.349 Therefore, the theory that patient
beneficiaries will choose hospital admissions based upon this publicized quality data
is not well supported. Rather, this data may encourage physicians and insurance
companies to decide for the patient.350 The debate remains as to whether publication
of data obtained ostensibly for quality improvement is a useful tool for prevention of
adverse events or a weapon destined to be used as a cost shifting measure in the
malpractice forum.351
XI. GOAL ACCOMPLISHMENT THROUGH COOPERATION, REGULATION AND
INFORMATION
Congress should not utilize its spending power through CMS to punish and
coerce the hospital system based on non-uniform and poorly defined quality data.
Rather, it should encourage cooperation to identify and find a solution to quality and
cost issues.352
Quality improvement and cost control are shared goals of Congress, CMS, and
health care providers. However, CMS and hospitals seek to accomplish these goals
through different means. CMS tries to force improvement through legislation and
resultant regulation while hospitals are focused upon direct interaction with

347

A hospital facility is “in network” if it has signed a reimbursement agreement with an
insurance plan such that patient beneficiaries are encouraged to utilize the facility by
providing increased coverage or lower fees for service. MILLER, supra note 5, at 527.
348
See Robert Steinbuch, Preventing Under-Equipped Medical Facilities from Killing
Heart Attack Patients: Correcting Inefficiencies in the Current Regulatory Paradigm for
Providing Critical Health Care Services to Patients with Acute Coronary Syndrome, 17
HEALTH MATRIX 17 (2007) (noting the current debate between regulations that mandate
ambulance transport to the closest facility versus to the most capable facility).
349

Id.

350

Batchis, supra note 64, at 502. “In reality, patients cannot shop around for the best
deal on medical care.” Id.
351
352

See, e.g., id at 501.

See, e.g., Janet M. Corrigan et al, Leadership by Example: Coordinating Government
Roles in Improving Health Care Quality, NAT’L ACAD. PRESS 6 (2002), available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10537, (recommending that government health
care programs establish consistent quality expectations, promote and encourage excellence
through reward systems, actively collaborate with each other and the private sector, encourage
and enable the consumer, and seek collaborative innovation).

2008]

TO PAY OR NOT TO PAY

133

patients.353 While CMS is able to view the healthcare industry from a vantage that
should allow a global understanding, hospitals and providers are understandably
enmeshed in the problems of day to day business.354 It is no secret that health care in
this country is piecemeal and provides non-uniform care to similarly situated
individuals.355 This lack of uniformity persists even though national hospital
accreditation and physician certification agencies impose conformity at the cost of
facility and practitioner survival.356
Nonetheless, an opportunity now exists where motivation to prevent serious
adverse events, however defined, drives compilation of extensive quality related data
which heretofore has been carefully guarded.357 Congress, through CMS and the
spending power, may provide for focused quality review by encouraging report of
quality issues.358 This reporting should not only be biased toward serious adverse
events, but also to all adverse events because near miss events may illuminate ways
to avoid disastrous outcomes.359
Also, Congress should protect this data from abuse and misuse. This deceptively
difficult task must balance the need for open evaluation of the data with the
fundamental rights of patient and provider privacy.360 Nonetheless, improved sharing
of quality data should be encouraged among the various hospitals and providers to
stimulate discussion about complex patient care and unforeseen problems of clinical
advancement.
Congress may encourage innovation of new methods of care that improve quality
and balance cost. Who better than the people most responsible for these adverse
events, such as hospitals, physicians, and their staff, to discover and formulate
working solutions to the quality and cost dilemma?361

353
This distinction is notable in the IOM recommendations for QIO where the QIO
program is placed in a guidance position for providers who perform the services. See Leavitt,
supra note 75, at 3, 5.
354

See Huntoon, supra note 56, at *2-3. These arguments correspond to the colloquial
“big picture” views where sometimes one is so enmeshed in detail that he “cannot see the
forest for the trees.” Id. at *3.
355

This is especially true for the under or un-insured who face discriminatory pricing for
hospital services. Batchis, supra note 6, at 500-03.
356
Hospitals and physicians must conform to the nationally set guidelines in order to
receive payment for services from Medicare and many private insurers. See MILLER, supra
note 5, at 65-74.
357

See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. §
1320d-2 (1996); Patient confidentiality of records is a response to a fundamental need for
privacy and avoidance of misuse of data for employment or insurance discrimination. MILLER,
supra note 5, at 428.
358

Kohn, supra note 2, at 88-90.

359

Id.

360

See Harrington, supra note 21, at 353-55.

361

It is long recognized that people who develop their own methods of change better
adjust and respond to change. See generally, Eric Brown et al., Multilevel Analysis of
Community Prevention Collaboration, 41 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 115 (2008); Lynne
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With the spending power, Congress may encourage aid to hospitals and providers
who are financially struggling and help them to catch-up to their more affluent
counterparts.362 This encouragement may be in the form of actual financial aid, such
as costs of increased technological updates, or may include relief of existing costs
such as taxes.363
Finally, Congress may utilize its power to further aid the beneficiary who has
been injured by negligence and truly avoidable errors to seek justified damage
awards through the court system.364 In this way, Congress may help vulnerable
beneficiaries instead of forsaking them when serious adverse events occur yet still
recuperate legitimate costs of unexpected care. In short, Congress, through CMS,
may employ its constitutionally granted spending power to spur cooperative and
innovative solutions to health care’s emergent quality problems. Congress can aid
providers to “heal themselves” by rational utilization of quality data.
XII. CONCLUSION
The proposed Medicare reimbursement schedule intended to become effective in
October 2008 represents a drastic change to the traditional policy of payment for
needed services.365 The proposal mandates that certain preventable adverse events
should not be reimbursed.366 This spending scheme is intended to improve quality
while decreasing cost to the Medicare system.367
The goals of the spending scheme are laudable. Quality improvement, when used
to improve the health, safety and general welfare of the intended patient beneficiary
of the Medicare program, is a rational and compelling government interest that
warrants coercive use of authorized spending power.368 This beneficial interest may
also rationally justify regulation of the health care industry through conditional

Baillie et al., Community Health, Community Involvement, and Community Empowerment:
Too Much to Expect?, 32 J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 217 (2004).
362

The Value Based Purchasing Program (VBP) is an interesting spending incentive tool
that allows for monetary rewards for hospitals that do well on quality reviews. See Ferman,
supra note 134, at *1. However, the benefit of the program is ironic because the program also
decreases hospital payments such that the bonuses merely replace the missing funds. Id.
Therefore, the hospital is punished then offered redemption as a coercive method of behavioral
change.
363

Congress may also encourage state participation in cost adjustments or offer financial
aid to struggling hospitals on the condition they conform to HIT electronic record
requirements. See supra note 331.
364

The beneficiary could be made aware of or even involved in the investigation of
serious adverse events. If the investigation reveals a possible negligence action then CMS
could facilitate the patient’s litigation or mediation with the involved parties. In this way,
Medicare would recover its loss through improved subrogation while providing a needed
service to its beneficiaries.
365

See supra Part VI.

366

Id.

367

Id.

368

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395c (West 2008).
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acceptance agreements.369 However, the spending power and imposed regulations
must bear a rational relationship to the intended goals and purpose of Medicare.370
Unintended consequences that will likely result from a refusal to pay for necessary
medical care because of hindsight review will likely decrease the quality and
increase the cost of the Medicare program.371
Furthermore, other foreseen consequences involve the establishment of new
precedent for health reimbursement that would likely worsen the number and status
of un-insured and under-insured individuals in America by encouraging other thirdparty payors to follow suit.372
Nonetheless, the focus on serious adverse events provides a means to achieve
both quality improvement and cost control goals.373 The focus has also spurred
compilation and analysis of data from hospitals throughout the nation.374 This data,
even in its raw and non-uniform state, may document scope of the problem and spur
innovative discussion among legislators, health care providers, and facilities
regarding necessary improvements.375 Discussion may be focused such that balance
of quality improvement and cost savings may be achieved.376
However, care must be taken to avoid abuse of this data. Fear of abuse is the
main obstacle to data compilation and open discussion.377 This data may be abused
by third-party payors as a means to shift the cost burden upon the health care
providers and facilities through use of the court system and malpractice claims.378
Further abuse may occur if third-party payors’ use their inherent spending power to
impose life style values upon covered individuals as a condition of coverage thereby
severely hampering fundamental freedom of choice.379
Therefore, rather than impose the proposed spending scheme of non-payment for
serious adverse events Congress, through CMS, should utilize its vast resources to
encourage valid compilation of quality data throughout America’s hospital and
health care system.380 It should provide a means to obtain a non-biased and objective
analysis of the data and identify methods which improve quality while balancing cost

369

See supra note 75.

370

See supra Part VII.

371

See supra Part IX.

372

Id.

373

See supra note 172.

374

See supra Part X.

375

Id.

376

See Rohack, supra note 167 (suggesting that “[a] more effective patient safety
approach would be to encourage compliance with evidence-based guidelines by health care
professionals.”).
377

See, e.g., Kohn, supra note 2, at 110; Pear, supra note 315.

378

See supra note 235.

379

See Crossley, supra note 13, at 135.

380

See supra Part XI.
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efficiency and avoiding undue punishment.381 Publication should not occur until
valid and open discussion has brought concurrence about realistic goals and methods
of accomplishment.382
Congress and CMS should facilitate cooperation between the regulatory force of
government and the functions of hospitals and providers because, in the end, both the
government and health care facilities have the same goals. Both desire improved
quality of health care through avoidance of serious adverse events and both desire
improved cost efficiency. Congress has the power to identify goals and direct change
while hospitals and providers have the means to effectuate change at the level of the
beneficiary. Mutual cooperation while avoiding coercion and punishment will
ultimately identify ways to improve quality and balance cost.

381
382

Id.

Even IOM maintains confidential all discussions and data analysis that were utilized in
preparation of its publications to “protect the integrity of deliberative process.” Kohn, supra
note 2, at vii.

